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FORWARD 
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force (SAF), Dr. James G. Roche, the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) established an Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFCSE) at its Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio, campus in 2002. The AFCSE was tasked to develop case studies focusing on the 
application of systems engineering principles within various aerospace programs. The intent of these case studies 
was to examine a broad spectrum of program types and a variety of learning principles using the Friedman-Sage 
Framework to guide overall analysis. In addition to this case, many other studies are available at the AFCSE web 
site, such as:  
• Global Positioning System (GPS) (space system)  
• Hubble Telescope (space system)  
• Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) (complex software development)  
• F-111 Fighter (joint program with significant involvement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
[OSD])  
• C-5 Cargo Airlifter (very large, complex aircraft)  
• B-2 Bomber (cutting edge stealth, structures, and flight controls) 
• A-10 Attack Aircraft (competitive development of critical technologies) 
• Peacekeeper (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile [ICBM])  
These cases support academic instruction on systems engineering within military service academies and at both 
civilian and military graduate schools, as well as training programs in industry. Each case study is comprised of 
elements of success, as well as examples of systems engineering decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal. Both 
types of examples are useful for learning. Plans exist for future case studies focusing on various space systems, 
additional aircraft programs, munitions programs, joint Service programs, logistics-led programs, science and 
technology/laboratory efforts, and a variety of commercial systems. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to develop and acquire joint complex systems that deliver needed 
capabilities to our warfighters. Systems engineering is the technical and technical management process that focuses 
explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products. The Air Force leadership has 
collectively stated the need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. 
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers and chief engineers, both 
within the Government and those working for the various prime and subcontractors, we concluded that today’s 
systems programs face similar challenges. Applicable systems engineering principles and the effects of 
communication and the environment continue to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution. We 
look forward to your comments on this case study and the others that follow. 
 
GEORGE E. MOONEY, SES  
Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering  
Air Force Institute of Technology  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the United Stated Government. 
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1. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process  
1.1.1 Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to develop and acquire joint military service 
weapon systems and deliver the needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective 
to improve and mature the acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative 
methodologies to purchase these technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering 
process, focused explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products 
that meet the needs of customers and stakeholders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems 
engineering is the technical and technical management process that results in delivered products 
and systems that exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate 
effectively from identified gaps in mission-level capabilities to establish system-level 
requirements, allocate these down to the lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and 
verification of performance, meeting cost and schedule constraints. The systems engineering 
process changes as the program progresses from one phase to the next, as do the tools and 
procedures. The process also changes over the decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and 
evolving from the base established during the conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has 
a long history. Examples can be found demonstrating a disciplined application of effective 
engineering and engineering management, as well as poorly applied, but well-defined processes. 
Throughout the many decades during which systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, 
many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools have been developed, documented, and applied.  
Several core life-cycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging during 
any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements. Secondly, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the 
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower-level components. And, third, 
the system requirements need to be stable and balanced and properly reflect all activities in all 
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the system 
design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive to 
satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying 
the requirements or set of requirements. 
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to 
establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy 
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level 
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and 
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows 
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs. 
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas.  
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical architectural 
designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is applied to 
subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems. Once a solution is 
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planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to ensure 
satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and 
measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes place 
well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented in the 
literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of the 
systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions, guides, and 
handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), Electronics 
Industrial Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and 
various DoD agencies and organizations. They show the process as it should be applied by 
today’s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), is depicted by Figure 1. It should be noted that this model is not 
accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the lowest level 
of definition of the design and its interfaces. 
 
Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as presented by the Defense Acquisition University. 
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1.1.2 Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades and has expanded 
and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly complex 
internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop aircraft and other 
weapons of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the practitioners 
and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. However, the cost and schedule 
performance records of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-managed 
programs and programs with less than stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 
1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and running behind 
schedule. The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and more 
geographically and culturally distributed. The systems engineering process, as applied within the 
confines of a single system or single company, was no longer the norm. 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisitions, including system-of-systems (SoS) context, 
network-centric warfare and operations, and rapid growth in information technology (IT). For 
example, with SoS, a group of independently operated systems are interdependently related 
within and across all lanes of the interoperability to effectively support an overarching objective. 
These factors have driven a new form of emergent systems engineering, which focuses on certain 
aspects of our current process. One of these increased areas of focus resides in the architectural 
definitions used during system analysis. This process is differentiated by greater reliance on 
reusable architectural views describing the system context and Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS), interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented 
characteristics. The DoD has recently made these architectural products, described in the DoD 
Architectural Framework (DoDAF), mandatory to enforce this new architecture-driven, systems 
engineering process throughout the acquisition life-cycle. 
1.1.3 Case Studies 
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex SoS projects is a process 
matured and founded on the principles of systems developed in the past. The examples of 
systems engineering used in other programs, both past and present, provide a wealth of lessons to 
be used in applying and understanding today’s process. 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems engineering 
principles. Case studies facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term 
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The 
systems engineering case studies assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful 
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of 
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple 
professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied 
functional data is emphasized. Analysis of these aspects will provide the student with real-world, 
detailed examples of how the process plays a significant role in balancing cost, schedule, and 
performance. 
The utilization and misutilization of systems engineering principles are highlighted, with special 
emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering practices. Case 
studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition management and 
learning principles, including determining if: 
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• Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer. 
• Effective requirements analysis was applied. 
• Consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards was 
applied. 
• Effective test planning was accomplished. 
• Effective major technical program reviews were conducted. 
• Continuous risk assessments and management was implemented. 
• Reliable cost estimates and policies were developed. 
• Disciplined application of configuration management was demonstrated. 
• System boundaries were well-defined. 
• Disciplined methodologies were developed for complex systems.  
• Problem-solving methods incorporated understanding of the system within a bigger 
environment (customer’s customer). 
The systems engineering process translates an operational need into a set of system elements. 
These system elements are allocated and translated by the systems engineering process into 
detailed requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to 
the development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and optimize system 
and subsystem performance within cost and schedule to provide an operationally effective 
system throughout its life cycle. Case studies highlight the various interfaces and 
communications to achieve this optimization, which include: 
• The program manager/systems engineering interface, which is essential between the 
operational user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance 
requirements for the system and subsystems, 
• The Government/contractor interface, essential for the practice of systems engineering to 
translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements, and  
• The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, known and unknown, as well as internal and 
external. This objective specifically focuses on external factors and the impact of uncontrollable 
influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new instructions/policies, changing 
stakeholders or user requirements, or contractor and Government staffing levels. 
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to mega-trends in the systems engineering 
discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices vary with time. 
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1.1.4 Framework for Analysis 
This case study is presented in a format that follows the learning principles specifically derived 
for the program, using the Friedman-Sage Framework to organize the assessment of the 
application of the systems engineering process. The framework and derived matrix can play an 
important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and systems management, 
especially case studies that involve systems acquisition. The framework presents a nine-row by 
three-column matrix shown in Figure 2. 
 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared 
Responsibility 
3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and Management    
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual 
Design 
   
C. System and Subsystem Detailed Design 
and Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface Integration    
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post Deployment    
G. Life-Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and management    
I. System and Program management    
Figure 2. Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities. 
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Figure 2 represent phases in the systems engineering life 
cycle:  
 Requirements Definition and Management  
 Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design  
 Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation  
 Systems and Interface Integration  
 Validation and Verification  
 System Deployment and Post Deployment  
Three of the concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support:  
 Life-cycle Support  
 Risk Management  
 System and Program Management  
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman-Sage Framework suggests that 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life-cycle 
processes in systems acquisition and systems management support in the conduct of the process. 
Most other concept areas identified during the development of the matrix appear to be subsets of 
one of these areas. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent the 
responsibilities and perspectives of Government and contractor and the shared responsibilities 
between the Government and contractor.  
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The Friedman-Sage Matrix is not a unique systems engineering applications tool, but rather a 
disciplined approach to evaluate the systems engineering process, tools, and procedures as 
applied to a program. The Friedman-Sage Matrix is based on two major premises as the founding 
objectives:  
1. In teaching systems engineering, case studies can be instructive in that they relate aspects of 
the real world to the student to provide valuable program experience and professional 
practice to academic theory. 
  
2. In teaching systems engineering in DoD, there has previously been little distinction between 
duties and responsibilities of the Government and industry activities. More often than not, the 
Government role in systems engineering is the role of the requirements developer. 
 
1.2 Global Hawk Major Learning Principles and Friedman-Sage Matrix  
The authors’ selection of learning principles and Friedman-Sage Matrix are reflected in the 
Executive Summary of this case (separate attachment).  
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2. Global Hawk Descriptions 
2.1 Mission 
The Global Hawk is an advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance air system 
composed of a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and a common 
ground segment (CGS) for command, control, and data collection. Its primary mission is to 
provide overt, continuous, long-endurance, all-weather, day/night, and near-real-time, wide-area 
reconnaissance and surveillance. The air vehicle is coupled with an integrated ground-based 
Mission Control Element (MCE) and Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) that monitors 
autonomous flight and facilitates-aided control of the air vehicle, when required. 
The Global Hawk system consists of the aircraft, payloads, data links, ground stations, and 
logistics support package. The ground stations have the ability to provide command and control 
(C2) of up to three vehicles and at least one air vehicle payload from a single ground station. 
The Global Hawk system is to be employed at the Joint Forces Command request for a variety of 
missions according to the Air Force-developed CONOPS. The system is capable of near-real-
time transmission of collected data, meaning that information is delayed only by the time 
required for electronic processing, communication, and vehicle mechanical response. The air 
vehicles are supported by transportable ground stations equipped with both line-of-sight (LOS) 
and beyond-LOS communications for vehicle C2, health and status monitoring, and sensor data 
transmissions. Collected data are transmitted to a Common Imagery Ground Surface System 
(CIGSS) for archiving, post-processing, exploitation, and dissemination via direct transmission 
or terrestrial networks. Once deployed in-theater, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander 
apportions the Global Hawk, as required. Figure 3 depicts a top-level overview of the system’s 
operational architecture. 
2.2 Global Hawk System 
The Global Hawk system is comprised of three elements: Air Vehicle, Common Ground Station, 
and Support System. The production Global Hawk system has been evolved using a spiral 
development approach that feeds a block build approach. The prime contractor for the Global 
Hawk system is Northrop Grumman. As this study will show, the configuration of the Global 
Hawk system has changed significantly over time. 
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Figure 3. Global Hawk Integrated System1
2.2.1 Air Vehicle 
 
The Air Vehicle consists of the airframe and avionics/flight control elements. In addition, the Air 
Vehicle contains an Airborne Integrated Communication System that enables C2 of the air 
vehicle and its payload, health and status monitoring, raw data and product transfer, and other 
communication functions, such as those required by the Global Air Traffic Management 
(GATM) mandates. 
                                                 
1 Global Hawk Concept to Combat, Bob Ettinger, National Defense Industry Association 24thAnnual National Test 
& Evaluation Conference, 28 February 2008, Chart 5 
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2.2.1.1 Airframe 
The wings and tail of the Global Hawk are made of graphite 
composite material. The V-configuration of the tail provides 
a reduced radar and infrared signature. The wings have 
structural hard points for external stores. The aluminum 
fuselage contains pressurized payload and avionics 
compartments.  
The nose gear, which is a derivative of the F-5 design, is 
height adjustable to suit the runway characteristics. The 
landing gear automatically retracts at an altitude of 4,000 
feet. An electric generator system supplies 25 kilo-volt-amperes (KVA) of AC electrical power. 
Each Global Hawk is equipped with a single AE 3007H turbofan engine supplied by Rolls-
Royce North America. The engine is mounted on the top surface of the rear fuselage section with 
the engine exhaust between the V-shaped tails. 
One of the more significant changes to the RQ-4A (Block 10) Global Hawk configuration 
involved increasing the air vehicle payload from 2,000 lbs to 3,000 lbs. The reason was to 
incorporate increased capabilities associated with the sensor system. This change, which was put 
on contract in March 2002, resulted in a larger air vehicle. The larger air vehicle was dubbed the 
RQ-4B and was incorporated as part of Block 20. Figures 4 and 5 compare the differences 
between the two air vehicles. 
 
Figure 4. External Configuration of RQ-4A versus RQ-4B. 
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Characteristics RQ-4A RQ-4B 
Wingspan 116 ft 130.9 ft 
Length 44 ft 47.6 ft 
Height 15.2 ft 15.3 ft 
Weight 11,350 lbs 14,950 lbs 
Maximum Takeoff Weight 26,750 lbs 32,250 lbs 
Fuel Capacity 15,400 lbs 17,300 
Payload 2,000 lbs 3,000 lbs 
Speed 340 knots 310 knots 
Range 9,500 nautical miles 8,700 nautical miles 
Figure 5. Major Differences between RQ-4A and RQ-4B2
2.2.1.2 Sensors 
. 
The main thrust of the air vehicle changes over time has involved the sensors. Figure 6 depicts 
the major sensor evolution. Block 0 refers to the Advanced Concept Technology Development 
(ACTD) air vehicles; Block 10 to the initial production air vehicles; and Block 20 through 40 to 
the larger production air vehicles with the increased payload. 
 
Figure 6. Sensor Development.3
                                                 
2 Factsheets: RQ-4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System, Air Force Link, October 2008 
 
3 Global Hawk Concept to Combat, Bob Ettinger, National Defense Industry Association 24th Annual National Test 
and Evaluation Conference, 28 February 2008, Chart 3 
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Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems supplies the Global Hawk Integrated Sensor Suite (ISS) 
that includes the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and infrared sensor system.  
Raytheon also supplies the Enhanced Integrated Sensor Suite (EISS), which improves the range 
of both the SAR and infrared system by approximately 50 percent. Figure 7 is a cutaway of the 
air vehicle, showing the ISS locations. 
Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor, with Raytheon as the major subcontractor, for the 
Air Force Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP). MP-RTIP is an 
active, electronically scanned array radar that can be scaled in size for different platforms. Three 
MP-RTIP systems are being built for Global Hawk and three for the E-10A Multi-sensor 
Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A). The first Global Hawk with the MP-RTIP is scheduled 
for delivery in 2011. 
 
 
Figure 7. Cutaway of Global Hawk Showing Integrated Sensor Suite Locations4
                                                 
4 Transitioning an ACTD to an Acquisition Program, Col. G. Scott Coale, Defense AT&L, September-October 
2006, Page 9 
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2.2.1.3 Flight and Navigational Control 
The air vehicle’s flight control and navigation functions are managed by two Integrated Mission 
Management Computers that integrate data from the navigation system. The prime navigation 
and control system consists of two Inertial Navigation System/Global Positioning System 
(INS/GPS) systems. The aircraft is flown by entering specific way points into the mission plan. 
Way points can be changed in flight, as necessary. No joystick is used in flying the air vehicle. A 
computer mouse is used to modify the flight control mode to alter flight operation. 
2.2.2 Common Ground Segment 
The CGS coordinates data requests for the mission, prepares and executes the mission plan, and 
performs any mission re-tasking during a flight. It supplies digital near-real-time, high-quality 
imagery to the warfighter for combat situational awareness. The CGS consists of two elements: 
LRE and MCE (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Common Ground Segment 
The LRE is located at the air vehicle base. It launches and 
recovers the air vehicle and verifies the health and status of the 
various onboard systems. During launch and recovery, it is 
responsible for air vehicle control, coordination with local and en 
route traffic facilities, and handoff of the air vehicle to the MCE. 
The element has the capability to C2 multiple air vehicles. 
The MCE serves as the cockpit during the operational portion of a 
mission. C2 data links provide the ground crew with complete 
control of the air vehicle. From this station, the pilot can 
communicate with outside entities, such as air traffic controllers, 
airborne controllers, and ground controllers, to coordinate the 
mission. The MCE is responsible for the mission elements that 
include flight, communication, sensor processing, and mission 
payload control. If necessary, the pilot can land the aircraft at any 
location provided in the mission plan. 
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2.2.3 Support Segment 
The Support Segment provides the resources to: a) prepare the Global Hawk system for 
operation; b) accomplish post-operation refurbishment; c) maintain the system to conduct 
training exercises; d) package the system for deployment; and e) set up the system at a deployed 
location. It includes the spares, support equipment, training systems, technical orders (TOs), etc., 
which are required to maintain the aircraft, train the personnel, and operate the air vehicle.  
3. Global Hawk Program 
3.1 Historical Background 
Much of the 20th
UAVs were tested during World War I but were never used by 
the United States. However, the technology progressed, and 
UAVs did play a role in World War II with the OQ-2 
Radioplane being the first mass produced UAV for the United 
States military. Reginald Denny and his partners began 
designing the OQ-2 target drone in 1938, and, in 1940, the 
Army awarded them a contract. By war’s end, 15,000 had been 
delivered and promptly destroyed during anti-aircraft training.
 century is dotted with examples of UAVs. UAVs were first mentioned in Jane’s 
All the World’s Aircraft in 1920. The earliest noteworthy UAV was the A. M. Low’s Aerial 
Target first tested on July 6, 1917. The vehicle was intended to be a target drone used for anti-
aircraft training. It was very basic but provided an example of the potential value of unmanned 
vehicles. Unfortunately, testing was prone to mechanical failures, and the program was canceled 
before its true usefulness could be demonstrated.  
5
The first real use of UAVs by the United States in a 
combat reconnaissance role began during the Vietnam 
War. UAVs, such as the AQM-34 Firebee developed by 
Teledyne Ryan, were used for a wide-range of missions, 
such as intelligence gathering, decoys, and leaflet 
dropping. Even though the loss rate of the UAVs was 
reasonably high, they were still preferred over the use of 
manned vehicles.  
 Likewise, Germany’s use of the 
V-1 “flying bomb” laid the groundwork for post-war concept exploration.  
The Israeli Air Force pioneered several UAVs in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1982, United 
States observers noted Israel’s use of UAVs in Lebanon 
and persuaded then Navy Secretary John Lehman to 
acquire a UAV capability for the Navy. Interest 
continued to grow in other elements of the Pentagon, 
and the Reagan Administration increased the UAV 
procurement in the fiscal year (FY)87 budget 
submission. This act marked the transition of UAVs in the United States from experimental to 
acquisition. One of the UAVs acquired by the Navy was the RQ-2 Pioneer. It was developed 
jointly by AAI Corporation and Israeli Aircraft Industries and became a very useful air vehicle 
                                                 
5 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the US Military, Donald Myers, Illinois Institute of Technology 
RQ-2 Pioneer 
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during Desert Storm for collecting tactical intelligence. The Navy battleships used the Pioneer to 
locate Iraqi targets for their 16-inch guns.  
Figure 9 is a brief summary of the UAV evolution over the course of the 20th century. By the 
early 1990s, UAVs had shown their worth and began earning a tactical role in our military plans 
of operation. However, past UAV programs were historically plagued by cost growth, schedule 
slips, and technical shortfalls. Examples included the Army’s Lockheed Aquila that was canceled 
in the late 1980s and the Teledyne Ryan BQM-145A that was canceled in 1993. The cause of the 
poor track record in the United States is unclear. One theory is that the UAVs never had the 
universal support of the operational user (“silk scarf syndrome”). If you couple this with the cost 
overruns and lack of an integrated DoD vision, UAVs had a difficult path forward.  
 
Figure 9. Noteworthy Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) Through 1993 
In 1988, Congress directed the consolidation of DoD UAV program management and formed the 
UAV Joint Program Office (JPO). In July 1993, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) endorsed a three-tier approach in acquiring UAVs: 
  Tier I  Quick Reaction Capability 
  Tier II  Medium Altitude Endurance 
  Tier III  Full Satisfaction of the Mission Need Statement 
Tier I and II were pursued through the Gnat 750 and Predator programs. After a brief study, the 
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) replaced the Tier III approach with a parallel 
Tier II+/Tier III- approach. Tier II+ would be a conventional high-altitude endurance vehicle, 
while Tier III- would be a low observable vehicle. 
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3.2 Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) Phase 
3.2.1 Original Acquisition Strategy 
The requirement for a Global Hawk type of system grew out of Operation Desert Storm and the 
Air Force’s need to find mobile SCUD missiles. The Services all agreed that an air vehicle was 
needed that could loiter at high altitude and provide extended surveillance of a given target area. 
This need was substantiated by several post-Desert Storm reviews, including those conducted by 
the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and Defense Science Board. In response to the JROC 
three-tier approach for developing UAVs, the DARO formed the High Altitude Endurance 
(HAE) UAV Program Office. The office was chartered with developing a family of unmanned 
reconnaissance vehicles meeting the objectives of the modified Tier II+/Tier III- approach 
discussed in Paragraph. 3.1 above.  
DARO sponsored the program but assigned program management responsibility to the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for the initial phases of ACTD. The Air Force 
was a participating organization with the intent of assuming program management responsibility 
for the final phases. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which established the 
program, clearly stated that the effort would focus not only on development of the two systems 
(Tier II+ and Tier III-) but also on management issues that often plagued past programs. The 
MOU also required that the program be managed by a JPO having a DARPA Program Director 
supported by both an Air Force and Navy Deputy Director. The intent was to ensure the buy-in 
of both the Air Force and Navy, thus integrating the development efforts, a concern previously 
expressed by Congress. Later within ACTD, an Army Deputy Director was also included in the 
JPO. The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) was identified as the user and was 
responsible for assessing military utility before the start of Phase III. USACOM was also 
designated as a participant in program reviews and a partner in developing the CONOPS.  
The HAE program was comprised of two separate air vehicles designated as Tier II+ and Tier 
III-. The Tier II+ configuration would be a conventional UAV capable of simultaneously 
carrying both a SAR and Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor suite. It was intended to 
compliment or replace the aging U-2 fleet. The Tier III- would be a low observable configuration 
capable of carrying either a SAR or EO/IR suite. Figure 10 is a summary of the performance 
objectives for each configuration, as defined in the initial HAE ACTD management plan.  
As this case study unfolds, it will be shown that the Tier II+ program became known as the 
Global Hawk, and the Tier III- became known as DarkStar. Since this case study focuses on the 
Global Hawk, the study will address DarkStar only as it impacts the Global Hawk program. 
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Characteristics Tier II+ Tier III- 
On-Station Lotier (hours) 24 >8 
Operating Radius (miles) 2000 – 3000 >500 
Loiter Altitude (ft msl) 60,000 – 65,000 >45,000 
True Air Speed (knots) 300 – 375 >250 
Takeoff Weight (lb) 15,000 – 27,000 8500 
Survivability Measures Threat Warning, ECM, Decoys Low Observable 
Sensor Payload SAR, GMTI and EO/IR SAR or EO 
Sensor Payload Weight (lb) 1000 – 1500 1000 
Figure 10. High Altitude Endurance (HAE) Performance Objectives6
The strategy for the HAE UAV Tier II+ program involved four phases, as depicted in Figure 11. 
Phases I through III represented the ACTD program which was to be completed between 
October 1994 and December 1999, with Phases II and III running concurrently for six months in 
1997. Phase IV represented production. No Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) was originally planned. 
 
Phase I: A six-month effort in which three teams conducted a System Objective 
Review and Preliminary System Specification Review 
Phase II: A 27-month effort in which two teams designed and developed the 
UAV configuration, complete with a System Specification and interfaces. The 
prototype system would then be built and undergo initial flight testing. The 
products for each team included two prototype air vehicles, one set of sensors, 
one ground segment, and one support segment capable of demonstrating the 
overall, integrated system performance 
Phase III: A 36-month effort in which a single team would demonstrate their 
integrated system operational utility. The products included eight fully integrated, 
pre-production air vehicles (except for two EO/IR sensors), two ground segments, 
and the logistics support necessary for a two-year field demonstration 
Phase IV: Open-ended serial production of Air Vehicle (A/V) #11 and beyond, as 
well as Ground Segment #4 and beyond 
In establishing the HAE program, DARPA recognized the failures of past UAV programs 
because of unit costs far exceeding what the user was willing to fund. In an attempt to overcome 
the historical problems, DARPA, with congressional support, implemented a new acquisition 
strategy significantly different from past DoD strategies. The strategies involved the following: 
                                                 
6 HAE UAV ACTD Management Plan, Version 1.0, December 94 (draft), Table 1 
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Figure 11. Original Tier II+ Schedule 
ACTD: The ACTD concept was initiated coincidentally with development of the Tier II+ 
program strategy. In 1994, the ACTD process evolved in response to the recommendations of the 
Packard Commission (1986) and Defense Science Board (1987, 1990, and 1991). The concept 
was developed to provide a rapid, cost-effective means to introduce new capabilities into the 
military services. The core elements of the ACTD initiative, according to Dr. Kaminski, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD [A&T]), were as follows: 
“There are three characteristics…which are the hallmark of the program. The first 
is that there is usually joint service involvement in an ACTD. Second, ACTDs 
allow our warfighter to perform a very early operational assessment of a system 
concept before we’ve invested a lot of money in the concept. And third, there is 
usually some residual operational capability left in the field at the completion of 
an ACTD, even if we haven’t decided to put the program into a full development 
phase.” 7
The ACTD process was intended to be unique from other acquisition reform efforts. It was 
distinct by virtue of its emphasis on heavy user involvement. It provided an opportunity for new 
concepts to be developed through a process whereby operational tactics were developed 
concurrently with the hardware. The overall system would not be judged until an operational 
demonstration. 
 
                                                 
7 DoD News Briefing, 28 June 1995 
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The entire ACTD process, including source selection and funding, was overseen by the ACTD 
Steering Group chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the 
selection of ACTDs was reviewed by the JROC through the Joint Warfare Capability 
Assessment groups. The technologies to be evaluated were selected by a small group of Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials fondly 
dubbed the “Breakfast Club.” There were three possible outcomes for an ACTD program: 
1. Concept fails and is discarded 
2. Concept works but needs additional development and proceeds into Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development  
3. Concept works and bypasses EMD 
Since the basic acquisition strategy of the HAE program evolved during the same time period as 
the ACTD process, there was close coordination between the principles of both activities during 
the 1993-1994 time period. This allowed the HAE to be accepted as an ACTD program and 
allowed the JPO to move forward with their solicitation to industry in April 1994 before the 
ACTD process was formally introduced.  
Pilot Acquisition Provisions of Public Law 
Another significant strategy implemented was the use of a newly adopted legislation that 
permitted the removal of many oversight and management processes typically required by 
Government acquisitions. The authority granted by this provision was known as Section 845 
Other Transactions Authority (OTA). The HAE program had been classified as a Pilot 
Acquisition Program under Public Law 101-189, Section 2371, Title 10, United States Code 
(USC), and under Section 845 of the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Public 
Law 103-160). This not only released the contractor from complying with Military 
Specifications (MIL-SPECs) but also released them from a series of Government rules and 
regulations, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs); Defense FAR Supplement; 
Armed Services Procurement Act; Competition in Contracting Act; and Truth in Negotiations 
Act. It also freed the contractor from the requirement to undergo Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA) audits, thus allowing the use of commercial auditors. In essence, all procurement 
system regulations were non-applicable. However, this waiver was initially granted only through 
Phase II. Extension of the waiver into Phase III was not a given and thus represented a program 
risk. If the program transitioned into Phase IV, there was a good chance that the program would 
return to the “standard” acquisition process. 
Section 845 OTA allowed DARPA to operate under an “agreement” instead of a contract. Two 
key differences between a typical contract and an “agreement” are defined in Article IV and VII. 
For an “agreement,” Article IV, Payable Event Schedule, permits the parties to agree to changes 
in payable milestones based on program events, and Article VII, Disputes, designates the 
DARPA director as the ultimate arbiter of disputes. Section 845 OTA also transferred significant 
management and design responsibility to the contractor. This allowed the contractor to operate 
under few obligations, gave the contractor the ability to cease work at any time without penalty, 
limited Government direction, and required no formal reporting or tracking. In essence, the 
agreement gave the JPO limited influence as reflected by the following section of the agreement: 
“This agreement gives extraordinary responsibility and authority to Teledyne 
Ryan Aeronautical (TRA) The Government will not unilaterally direct 
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performance within or outside the scope of the work. Thus the government must 
be able to convince TRA of the need for change.” 
Design Requirements: One of the more radical strategies of the program was the emphasis on 
Unit Flyaway Price (UFP). Programs in the demonstration phase typically establish a set of 
system-level performance requirements that they convey to the contractor in a form, such as a 
System Requirements Document. There would also be some method of unit procurement cost 
control established to help set production boundaries. However, history has shown that the cost 
control measure seldom worked. Past UAV programs were no exception, with costs sometimes 
escalating to the point that the user was no longer willing to fund the program. Over the years, 
several cost control initiatives were pursued. During the 1970s, the concept of Design to Cost 
(DTC) was implemented. The concept was “to set a cost goal early on, similar to the way a 
performance goal is set, and then design to that goal.”8
Consistent with the strategy of specifying only one firm requirement, the $10 million UFP, the 
program developed a set of desired performance characteristics that were defined in terms of a 
range of values considered acceptable. The parameters were labeled as goals, either as Primary 
Objective, Objective, or Desired. This approach gave the contractor the latitude and 
responsibility to define the balance among the desired performance parameters, so the user 
would receive the “biggest bang for the buck.” This freed the JPO from closely tracking the 
contractor’s progress in meeting a large number of individual performance specifications. The 
JPO even tried hard to avoid giving the impression that they valued one specific performance 
goal over another. 
 However, an Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA) study concluded that the DTC approach did not result in any significant 
improvement to cost control. Another concept was the fixed price development that was typically 
incorporated with the broader concept of total package procurement. Here, the initial 
development contract would typically define a set of system descriptors, performance 
specifications, and a fixed cost requirement. As usual, estimates were inevitably optimistic, and 
the concept failed. In the early 1990s, Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) was developed 
with the idea that the user would play a stronger role in establishing the initial balance between 
cost and other system performance parameters. However, no specific application of this approach 
was known at the start of the Tier II+ program. With no evidence of a successful cost control 
strategy, the JPO, in concert with DoD, developed a new strategy that treated cost as the sole 
design requirement with all performance objectives subject to trade. Before Phase I contract 
award, a $10 million (FY94 dollars) UFP cap was imposed by the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Advanced Technology. 
Integrated Product and Process Development 
An additional element of the JPO strategy was the use of Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) and associated Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPPD is a management 
technique that integrates all the essential acquisition activities into multidisciplinary teams 
organized according to product areas, not discipline. These IPTs are characterized by participants 
empowered to make decisions and commitments for the functional areas they represent. The 
Government program members work closely with the contractor IPTs, operating in an 
atmosphere of teamwork and mutual trust. The goal is to optimize design, manufacturing, and 
                                                 
8 Acquiring Major Systems: Cost and Schedule Trends and Acquisition Initiative Effectiveness, Karen W. Tyson et 
al, Institute for Defense Analyses, Paper P-2201, March 1989 
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supportability. It is a concept that evolved from the concurrent engineering practice and was first 
implemented in the DoD on the F-22. On May 10, 1995, the Secretary of Defense directed that 
IPPD and IPTs be applied to the acquisition process to the maximum extent possible. Even 
though the Tier II+ program was exempt from the standard procurement regulations, the JPO 
supported the concept and strongly encouraged its use. The contractor complied. 
Design for Low Program Risk 
Traditional DARPA programs tend to emphasize high system performance goals that increase 
the risk of failure. However, the JPO truly wanted the Tier II+ program to succeed. Thus, they 
tried to design a program that would have a relatively low risk of serious failure. In essence, they 
equated a program with high technical risk to a program that would not meet its cost 
requirements. One tactic used by the JPO was to convey to the contractor that the development 
funds were limited to a specific amount and that no additional funds would be made available. 
This strategy was particularly emphasized during the later phases of the program. 
Small JPO Staff 
The JPO was a very small, austere organization, purposely sized that way to ensure minimal 
oversight by the Government and provide a significant degree of autonomy to the contractors. 
3.2.2 Phase I 
The solicitation for Phase I was released in April 1994. The solicitation made it perfectly clear 
that the $10 million (FY94 dollars) UFP was the only program requirement. The solicitation 
gave the contractor total control in defining the configuration based on the performance goals 
defined in the Systems Capability Document and required $10 million UFP. A Task Description 
Document, Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), and Integrated Master Plan (IMP) were required 
for insight into all the systems and UFP allocation. The solicitation suggested a management 
approach involving IPTs, maximum use of commercial systems, streamlined processes, and 
contractor responsibility. 
The original intent, as defined in Paragraph 3.2.1 above, was to award competitive contracts to 
three separate teams. There was an unexpectedly large response to the solicitation because of the 
acquisition waivers that now facilitated the participation by nontraditional DoD contractors, such 
as Aurora and Grob. Fourteen teams responded. The bids submitted covered a wide-range of size 
and performance for a $10 million UFP, causing the Government to question the credibility of 
some of the estimates. When DARPA assessed the breadth and quality of the responses, they 
elected to select five teams. Each team was funded at a “not to exceed” $4 million, with 
payments to be made upon successful completion of contractually specified milestones. The five 
teams awarded contracts in October 1994 were: 
• Loral Systems with Frontier Systems 
• Northrop Grumman Aerospace with Westinghouse Electric 
• Orbital Sciences with Westinghouse Electric 
• Raytheon Missile Systems with Lockheed Advanced Development 
• TRA with E-Systems 
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Little information is available concerning the contractors’ performance during Phase I of the 
program. This is largely because of the “Competition Sensitive” nature of the phase, coupled 
with the short duration (six months). However, it can be concluded that the contractors did instill 
a degree of confidence that a reconnaissance-type UAV could be developed that would meet the 
user’s needs. 
During Phase I, DARPA formed a small JPO at Ballston, Virginia, with personnel assigned from 
the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). The JPO 
was also supported by a small cadre at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio. This 
was consistent with the strategy of a small Government staff. The JPO supported both the Tier 
II+ and Tier III- programs. In some cases, personnel were dedicated to one program, and, in 
other cases, personnel were shared between the two programs. The exact staffing level at the 
DARPA JPO during Phase I fluctuated but, on average, consisted of a core group of about 12 
people with half being engineers. Specialists were called in, as needed, from the various 
agencies. 
During Phase I, the JPO was busy preparing for the next phase. The JPO was forced to revise its 
acquisition strategy for Phase II because of funding constraints. Between release of the draft 
Phase I Solicitation on April 29, 1994, and the release of a revised version on June 1, 1994, the 
funding profile for Phase II/Phase III was reduced by $10 million. By release of the Phase II 
Solicitation on February 15, 1995, the funding profile was further reduced by another $88 
million. Figure 12 shows the funding profile as a function of time and phase. This funding 
reduction forced the JPO to choose between canceling the program, changing the Phase II 
activity content, or selecting a single Phase II contractor. The JPO chose the last option. When 
the change was announced midway through Phase I, the early elimination of competition became 
controversial both with the competing contractors and Capitol Hill. This was particularly true for 
the four contractors who eventually were not selected for Phase II. In their minds, TRA was the 
clear favorite, and, thus, they were competing for the runner-up contract. 
 29 Apr 94 1 Jun 94 15 Feb 95 
Phase I $12M $20M $20M 
Phase II $235M $230M $164M 
Phase III $275M $270M $248M 
Figure 12. Funding Changes 
In early February 1995, the Evaluation Factors were finalized for judging the upcoming Phase II 
proposals. The factors encompassed four areas as defined below: 
• System capability: How close is the proposed system to meeting the System Capability 
Document (SCD) objectives? How effective and suitable will the final system be, as a 
whole, in the operational environment? How stable is the proposed design and technical 
approach throughout the phases of the program? How well does the system design 
support growth and flexibility? (All these questions were addressed within the context of 
the $10 million UFP.) 
• Technical approach: Is the technical approach low-risk, and has the use of off-the-shelf 
technology been maximized? Is the design, development, and manufacturing approach 
adequate for each phase of the program? Are the technical processes described in the 
Process IMP adequate for their intended use? 
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• Management approach: Does the IMP depict a well-defined program that can be 
tracked easily? Does it propose a system that can be delivered within the resources 
provided? (Specific management functions evaluated included planning processes, 
program control, and organization; past performance was also evaluated.)  
• Financial approach: Will the offeror be able to execute the proposed program within the 
financial resources provided? Are those resources consistent with the UFP? (Specific 
criteria were reasonableness, realism, and completeness of cost estimates.) 9
On February 15, 1995, the Phase II solicitation was released. Source Selection followed shortly 
thereafter. 
 
3.2.3 Phase II 
TRA was selected for the Phase II contract in May 1995. 
The JPO viewed TRA’s approach to be relatively low risk. 
TRA proposed a relatively conservative design with the 
technical risk envisioned to be associated with the flight 
test program. Their design was at the high end of the 
weight scale, implying less technical risk but more cost 
risk should certain performance parameters miss their 
goals significantly. This was consistent with the JPO’s 
objective of a low-risk program.  
The technical content contracted in Phase II remained as 
initially planned, i.e., design and build two air vehicles and one ground segment, followed by 
flight testing sufficient to demonstrate the technical performance consistent with a $10 million 
(FY94 dollars) UFP. In order to ensure that all the technical characteristics would be fully 
addressed, TRA converted all the technical performance objectives into requirements. Trade-offs 
could then be made later, if required, to meet the UFP requirement. The Phase II schedule, 
however, was expanded with the agreement of the contractor from the originally planned 27 
months to 33 months. The additional six months was added to the flight test program. At the 
same time, Phase III was shortened from 36 months to 24 months.  
A successful end to Phase II required the following: 
• “Thumbs-up” by the user to continue 
• System Specification that all participants agreed would lead to a $10 million UFP. 
The key milestone dates for Phase II were: 
• First Flight December 1996 
• Phase II End December 1997 
At Phase II contract award, the original Tier II+ schedule depicted in Figure 11 remained 
essentially intact. The only significant change involved the notion of a CGS that could serve both 
                                                 
9 The Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Acquisition Process, A Summary of Phase I Experience, Geoffrey 
Sommer, Giles K. Smith, John L. Birkler and James R. Chiesa, RAND Corporation, 7 December 2007, Pages 7 and 
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the Tier II+ and Tier III-. Figure 13 shows the revision and will serve as the baseline for 
discussing future schedule changes. 
 
Figure 13. Global Hawk Schedule as of Mid-1995 
Program Name 
Early in Phase II, DARPA held a contest to establish the names for both the Tier II+ and Tier III- 
programs. Many names were submitted, and Gen Ralston, then Air Combat Command 
(ACC)/CC, selected the winning names. The Tier II+ program was dubbed Global Hawk, and the 
Tier III- was dubbed DarkStar. Program documentation continued to use the term Tier II+ 
throughout ACTD, but the term was dropped in favor of the Global Hawk once the program 
entered EMD/Production. 
Phase II Agreement, dated August 3, 1995 
Consistent with the latitude granted by Section 845 OTA, a Phase II Agreement was executed on 
August 3, 1995, with an effective date of April 6, 1995. The agreement added, by reference, a 
System Specification, Task Description Document, IMS, and IMP. The vision was that these 
documents combined would describe the system capability goals and how the Phase II activities 
would be organized. TRA also included in the agreement the following list of guidelines and 
processes aimed at ensuring low development risk and high military utility: 
• Early testing 
• Compatibility with existing military systems 
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• Integrated product development philosophies 
• Trade-offs to maximize military utility 
• Built-in growth path 
• Maximized use of off-the-shelf equipment 
• Maximized use of open architectures 
• Minimized system life-cycle cost 
• Required supplier participation in the IPT structure 
• Invited customer participation in the IPT structure 10
The negotiated Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) was $157,348,000. An additional Cost Plus Fixed 
Fee (CPFF) was included for other tasks. 
 
TRA Organization 
As prime contractor, TRA was responsible for the development and integration of three system 
segments: Air Vehicle Segment, Ground Segment (MRE and LRE), and Support Segment. This 
responsibility led to the formation of the following IPTs: 
• Air Vehicle Segment 
• Payload Segment 
• Ground Segment 
• Support Segment 
• Systems Engineering/Program Management 
• System Test 
The TRA engineering organization was roughly characterized by two groups: the young 
engineers, some with experience on guided missiles, and the older, experienced “Elder 
Statesmen” that had worked on TRA’s high flying drones (Compass Cope and Compass Arrow). 
The Chief Engineer was responsible for creating his organization. He personally did much of the 
hiring and approvals. First and foremost, he followed the philosophy that each IPT lead needed 
to be an excellent engineer who liked people and had good interpersonal skills. Each IPT lead 
formally signed an agreement that he would be responsible for his product from “womb to 
tomb.” There was no such thing as throwing an issue over the wall to hide it. In some instances, 
small Tiger Teams were constituted for a short period of time for tasks that required intense 
multi-disciplinary involvement. Everyone within each IPT inherently liked empowerment and 
understood that individual responsibility came along with the empowerment. It also meant that 
they had to own up to their mistakes, so the mistakes could be corrected quickly without 
recrimination. The team instituted a Toyota approach, which allowed anyone on the team to stop 
the project if he saw something terribly wrong. The Chief Engineer reviewed and, in some cases, 
co-wrote, amended, and approved each and every system/subsystem document.  
                                                 
10 Innovative Management in the DARPA High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner, Geoffrey Sommer, Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 7 December 2007, Pages 43 and 44 
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The Global Hawk program also had a small designated systems engineering organization, as well 
as systems engineers located within each of the IPTs. The contractor integrated the systems 
engineering function partly into the technical management structure where some of the IPT leads 
were experienced in the systems engineering discipline. The Chief Engineer created this 
organization and chose the IPT leads based on leadership capability, interpersonal skills, and 
technical excellence in their area of expertise (systems engineering, design, analysis, 
manufacturing/assembly, logistics, cost, ground segment, communications, payloads, etc.). In 
this concept, the Chief Engineer was the individual with primary responsibility to define and 
execute the systems engineering process. The Systems Engineering IPT lead and his small staff 
on the program worked with the Chief Engineer to define many of the processes and procedures 
to be used.  
JPO Organization 
The JPO formed a much smaller, mirror image of the TRA organization, so, in theory, there was 
a JPO segment lead to work directly with each TRA segment IPT lead. The JPO remained true to 
the strategy of maintaining a small JPO staff. This sometimes resulted in criticism that the JPO 
was understaffed and that it hindered its ability to interact with the contractor. At the start of 
Phase II, there was a combined total of about 15 full-time people supporting both Global Hawk 
and DarkStar, with about half being engineers. One Systems Engineer was included on the team. 
Similar to Phase I, specialists were called in, as needed, from the various agencies. The size of 
the JPO grew with time but remained small throughout the ACTD phase. The total JPO never 
exceeded about 30 full-time people with 10 of them being engineers. 
TRA/JPO Relationship 
One of the consistent remarks made by both TRA and JPO involved the excellent working 
relationship between the two groups (TRA and JPO). Everyone wanted to make the ACTD a 
success. In areas where one group was weak, the other group rolled up their sleeves, pitched in, 
and contributed greatly. There was no “beating around the bush;” just “let’s work together and 
get the job done.”  
The underlying Government strategy was to eliminate oversight but maximize insight. 
Consequently, program leadership stayed in regular contact, resolving issues in real-time. This 
approach meant that everyone on both sides was value-added, and the concept of multiple formal 
milestone reviews was considered irrelevant, since everyone who needed to know was fully in 
the loop. Both TRA and JPO worked extremely hard, and their availability was not limited to the 
standard 8:00 to 5:00 weekday. If flight testing, or a problem occurred on a Saturday or Sunday, 
people were always willing to support the need. The success of the ACTD program can be 
attributed to the team’s hard work, dedicated people, and strong leadership. 
ACC 
ACC had a Requirements Directorate for both the Global Hawk and Predator. This function was 
subsequently moved to the Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (AFC2ISR) Center. The Directorate generated the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) and was involved with the JPO in generating the Capability Development 
Document (CDD), terms that were used somewhat interchangeably.  
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Common Ground Station 
An amendment to the agreement for Phase II of the Global Hawk program, dated July 1995, 
included support for a CGS that would be used by both the Global Hawk and DarkStar. Within 
the Global Hawk program, the ground segment was the responsibility of one of TRA’s 
subcontractors, E-Systems. By October 1995, E-Systems had created an integrated set of 
requirements, and by year’s end, they proposed a CGS concept. “Sometime in mid-1996 the JPO 
realized that progress would be enhanced if TRA was relieved of management responsibility for 
development and integration of the common ground system.”11
Engineering Development 
 This would allow TRA to focus 
strictly on the Global Hawk system. Consequently the JPO assumed management of the CGS 
and contracted directly to E-Systems. E-Systems committed to a schedule that would deliver the 
CGS by mid-1999, a time sufficient to support both Phase III demonstrations. In the interim, this 
change in strategy left each of the two air vehicle companies free to develop unique ground 
segments consistent with their specific development and demonstration strategies and schedules.  
As activities progressed from concept to engineering development, the complexity of the 
activities increased. The RAND Corporation, which was contracted by DARPA to assess how 
the innovative strategies affected the program outcome, concluded that the main events and 
conditions listed below impacted the Global Hawk program during Phase II: 
• “Reduction in budget led to a loss of the competitive environment in Phase II. While the 
budget cut occurred in Phase I, it affected Phase II execution by radically changing the 
contractual and management environment from one that relied on competition to ensure 
contractor performance to a single-source best-effort arrangement with weak incentives 
and limited mechanism for government intervention. 
• Integration risk was underestimated. Inadequate emphasis was placed on the risks of 
software development and systems integration. 
• The lead contractor (TRA) was a relatively small organization with good experience 
in small UAV programs but little experience in large, complex programs. TRA’s 
primary expertise was in the air-vehicle system; it had inadequate capabilities in key 
software and integration areas. Being small, it had limited resources to apply to 
problems. It also had relatively weak management processes that, at least initially, 
were driven by personalities.”12
As noted, the major technical challenges were the software development and systems integration. 
During the first year of the program, TRA did not recognize the need for the significant software 
development that would follow. As the development progressed, it also became clear that the 
other critical challenge was in system integration, not air vehicle design. For example, the 
acquisition strategy emphasized the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) as a method to 
reduce cost. However, the risks and problems associated with integrating COTS into a complex 
system were underestimated. In some instances, such as the mission computer, the COTS 
equipment had to be redesigned. An additional explanation for some of the technical difficulties 
is that the technologies used for the air vehicle and electronic systems were not as mature as the 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid, Page 91 
12 ibid, Pages 48 and 49 
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team believed. Finally, in the second year of Phase II, TRA recognized the challenges and 
applied the additional resources. The challenges then began to come under control. 
Crash of the First DarkStar 
In April 1996, the first DarkStar crashed during takeoff on 
its second flight. Although the two projects were 
independent of each other, the DarkStar crash heightened the 
risk aversion on the Global Hawk program. This resulted in 
more conservative design decisions, increased reviews, 
unplanned single point failure analysis, and increased testing 
in the System Integration Laboratory (SIL) before first 
flight. One specific program consequence is that DARPA 
decided to delay first flight until the contractor completed a lengthy joint evaluation of all the 
software, flight control laws, and other flight critical subsystems. That effort delayed first flight 
by 8-10 months. All of this was consistent with the JPO’s acquisition strategy to Design for Low 
Program Risk. 
IMP and IMS 
Early in Phase II, the IMP and IMS tended not to be integrated and up-to-date. The IPTs worked 
to the schedule and cost targets but did not record their progress adequately. In April 1997, TRA 
implemented a process that fully integrated the cost and schedule status into their earned-value 
system. Likewise, the IMP and IMS were updated to reflect their current status, and greater 
emphasis was placed in maintaining and using these tools. 
Renegotiated Phase II Agreement, dated August 4, 1997 
Consistent with the latitude provided by Section 845 OTA, TRA and DARPA renegotiated the 
Phase II agreement to accommodate problems encountered to date. The agreement was 
summarized as follows: “The original agreement followed a CPIF contract approach. The new 
agreement requires cost-sharing at a threshold of $206 million of program cost at a ratio of 30 
percent TRA, 70 percent government, until a value of $228 million is reached, where the 
program is capped. Previously earned fees must begin to be paid back to the government at that 
point. TRA’s subcontractors begin participating in the cost share at $218 million. TRA is not 
obligated to continue to perform when the limit is reached unless the Agreement is further 
modified. The renegotiation also required that TRA and its team members invest $3.1 million in 
the SIL, above the value of the Agreement.” 13
Phase IIB Amendment, dated March 31, 1998 
 
Less than a year later, TRA and DARPA amended the Renegotiated Phase II Agreement to 
accommodate Phase III. The amendment definitized the tasks associated with manufacturing of 
AV-3, AV-4, and long-lead items for AV-5; authorized certain Contractor Acquired Property; 
provided incremental funding; and revised other affected Agreement Articles. The amendment 
also addressed the activities associated with building an ISS and performing Integrated Logistics 
Support tasks, such as providing technical manuals, spares, training, and software maintenance, 
all of which were not addressed by the previous agreements. 
                                                 
13 ibid, Page 59 
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Program Cost Growth and Schedule Slip 
Technical issues resulted in a cost growth and schedule slip. First, there were the issues 
associated with software development (e.g., Integrated Mission Management Computer 
software) and system integration. Then, there was the DarkStar crash. The investigation 
indicated that problems in the flight control software were the major cause. As a result, the JPO 
insisted that the flight control software be fully demonstrated on the SIL before first flight. To 
compound the tightening schedule, problems in developing the software delayed the full 
demonstration in the SIL.  
The result of these technical problems was an additional nine-month slip to the end of Phase II. 
Since the program was only funded through December 1999, the JPO was forced to offset the 
impact by shortening the 24-month user evaluation to 12 months (January 1999 to December 
1999). Likewise, the duration of Phase III was reduced to 15 months. This was necessary to 
maintain timing of the production decision.  
With all of this happening, the nonrecurring engineering costs increased. In a program review, 
the USD (A&T) directed that the program remain within the available funding. Ultimately, the 
quantity of vehicles procured during ACTD was reduced from 10 to five. Figure 14 depicts the 
new schedule as of mid-1998. 
 
Figure 14. Revised Global Hawk Schedules as of Mid-1998 
UFP Cost Growth 
Both the JPO and TRA believed that the UFP requirement was a viable way to control cost and 
encourage trade-offs. However, the amount of analysis that was used to define the $10 million 
(FY94 dollars) cap was unclear. A RAND Report which did an extensive study on the ACTD 
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phase of the program concluded: “We believe that the $10 million UFP was selected because it 
was judged to be high enough to provide a system with meaningful capability if adhered to, yet 
at the same time low enough that the Air Force would be willing to pay for it.”14 By the end of 
Phase II, both the JPO and TRA surmised that the $10 million UFP was unachievable and would 
be exceeded by $1 million to $3 million. The information was widely briefed amongst the 
participating organizations, but the Government did not make it publicly known. There were 
several reasons for the increase. According to a RAND Report, “Assumptions underlying the 
UFP have been violated, including production gaps and transitions to subsequent phases, 
subsystem initial costs, and cost improvement.”15 Likewise, TRA avoided the trade-offs of some 
functionality because of the fear of dropping a capability that the user wanted most. In other 
cases, the Government was accused of imposing “requirements creep.” However, the RAND 
study concluded that “The government was not adding superfluous systems; rather, they enabled 
or enhanced operational capabilities that DARPA did not understand well.”16
Performance Objectives 
 The issue of 
DARPA, the user, and the Air Force not clearly communicating requirements and their 
implications was a problem that occurred periodically throughout the program. This is perhaps 
one of the fallouts of not having a clearly defined set of requirements. 
As the design of the system matured, the performance parameters became better defined. Key 
characteristics, such as operating radius, loiter altitude, takeoff weight, and payload weight were 
expected to be at the high end of the spectrum. Figure 15 shows how the parameters evolved 
over time. 
Characteristics December ‘94 December ‘99 
On-Station Loiter (hours) 24 Same 
Operating Radius (miles) 2000 – 3000 3000 
Loiter Altitude (ft msl) 60,000 – 65,000 >60,000 
True Air Speed (knots) 300 – 375 300 - 350 
Takeoff Weight (lb) 15,000 – 27,000 25,600 
Survivability Measures Threat Warning, ECM, Decoys Same 
Sensor Payload SAR, GMTI and EO/IR Same 
Sensor Payload Weight (lb) 1000 – 1500 1800 
Figure 15. ACTD Performance Objectives 
3.2.3.1 Flight Test Planning 
Initial program planning called for flight testing to occur as part of the Phase II development and 
Phase III user evaluation. Phase II included a 12-month flight test program using the two 
engineering development models of the air vehicle and one CGS. Phase III was originally 
planned as a 24-month field demonstration with heavy participation from the user. Eight air 
vehicles were to be used with two additional CGSs. Demonstrations were intended to include 
combined Global Hawk/DarkStar participation and DoD training exercises. The plan for a 
                                                 
14 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar - Their Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator 
Program Experience, Executive Summary, Jeffrey A. Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, 
Page 16 
15 Innovative Management in the DARPA High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner, Geoffrey Sommer, Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 7 December 2007, Pages 43 and 44, Page107 
16 ibid, Page 108 
 
Global Hawk Systems Engineering Case Study 
 
 
Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFIT/SY) 
Air Force Institute of Technology  
 Page - 30  
ID 8844  
 
combined Global Hawk/DarkStar demonstration ended abruptly in January 1999 when the 
DarkStar program was terminated.  
The HAE UAV ACTD Management Plan, dated December 15, 1994, clearly conveyed the 
expectation that all 10 Global Hawk test vehicles (two Phase II and eight Phase III) and all three 
CGSs (one Phase II and two Phase III) would be identical, supporting a direct transition into 
production. DARO, the sponsoring agency, would provide the program funds though the end of 
Phase III, and the Air Force, the lead agency, would provide the operations and support funds. 
The ACTD Management Plan did not specify the expected number of flight hours. However, it 
did make clear the importance of the flight test program and introduced the concept that the 
contractor was responsible for the flight test program.  
The primary objective of Phase II testing was to validate the system’s technical performance 
against the contractor's System Specification. The Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) and 
System Maturity Matrix (SMM) goals were established and cross-referenced to the Preliminary 
System Specification. “The TPMs were related to the technical and payload incentives embodied 
in Attachment 5 of the Ryan Agreement.”17
A test plan was written to support the flight test program. It addressed not only the flight test but 
also the ground-based system and subsystem testing necessary to demonstrate readiness for first 
flight. The test plan specified only 16 flights because of the relatively small flight envelope 
inherent to the aircraft. The test plan called for every flight to demonstrate essentially the 
identical time duration, vehicle speed, and altitude profile. 
 The flight test program was structured as a steady 
progression in learning with each flight generating more confidence in the system performance 
and a better characterization of the TPMs and SSM. Tracking of the TPMs were particularly 
important since the ACTD program had no contractual performance requirements. 
Version 7 of the HAE UAV ACTD Management Plan provided more detail. Phase II testing 
would begin in mid FY97 and would last through the end of FY98. The Air Force Flight Test 
Center (AFFTC) would be responsible for coordinating airspace usage. The Phase II 
development tests would consist of seven airworthiness flights and nine payload flights over a 
12-month period. The Phase III demonstration was to start in the last quarter of FY98 and 
continue through the end of FY99. Exercises would be established by the commanders with the 
objective of identifying tasks that would demonstrate the Global Hawk’s contribution. The 
number of exercises would be determined based on the number deemed necessary to characterize 
the system’s utility.  
3.2.3.2 First Flight 
AV-1 rolled out of the TRA facility on February 20, 1997. While at Lindbergh Field in San 
Diego, California, the air vehicle guidance and navigation system was statically tested. There 
was the opportunity to perform taxi tests at Lindbergh Field, but its 
delivery to Edwards AFB, California, was already late. Thus, the air 
vehicle was disassembled and trucked to Edwards AFB on August 
28, 1997. Taxi tests began that October. The B-2 facility at South 
Base was used for the flight test program. It was fully equipped, 
                                                 
17 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar – Flight Test in the HAE UAV ACTD Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, Page 7 
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including a control room and access to a runway that was reasonably secluded; although, early 
operations were all off the main runway at Edwards AFB. The First-Flight Readiness Review 
(FFRR) occurred on February 9, 1998, followed by an additional week of software confidence 
testing. Poor weather caused additional delays, and the Global Hawk finally flew for the first 
time on February 28, 1998. Below is the official DoD news release that followed:  
“Global Hawk, the Department of Defense's newest reconnaissance aircraft, 
successfully flew for the first time at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., on 
Saturday, February 28.  
Global Hawk air vehicle number one, a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned 
air vehicle (UAV), took off from the Edwards Air Force Base main runway at 
7:43 a.m. (PST) and flew for 56 minutes. The UAV reached altitudes up to 32,000 
feet before landing on the base’s main runway. Global Hawk, with a 116-foot 
wingspan, navigated along a “bow tie” track within restricted air space. The entire 
mission, including the take-off and landing, was performed autonomously by the 
aircraft based on its mission plan. The Launch and Recovery Element of the 
system’s ground segment continuously monitored the status of the flight.  
The flight was the first of numerous air worthiness evaluation and payload 
demonstration flights planned. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is developing Global Hawk to provide military field commanders with 
a high-altitude, long-endurance system that can obtain high-resolution, near-real-
time imagery of large geographic areas.” 
“Today’s flight was an exceptional accomplishment for the Global Hawk team. 
This is a key milestone towards giving warfighters a powerful new capability," 
said DARPA’s program manager Col Doug Carlson, USAF. “Not only did Global 
Hawk perform beautifully, but the successful flight demonstrated how 
government, military, and contractor personnel can work together on a 
challenging development program. I am especially pleased with the excellent 
support we have received from the Edwards Air Force Base team, and I look 
forward to working with them as the program proceeds.” 
The new aircraft has been designed to operate with a range of 13,500 nautical 
miles, at altitudes up to 65,000 feet and with an endurance of 40 hours. During a 
typical reconnaissance mission, the aircraft can fly 3,000 miles to an area of 
interest, remain on station for 24 hours, survey an area the size of the state of 
Illinois (40,000 square nautical miles), and then return 3,000 miles to its operating 
base. During a typical mission, a Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving Target 
Indicator and Electro-Optical and Infrared sensors onboard the aircraft can 
provide near-real-time imagery of the area of interest to the battlefield 
commander via world-wide satellite communication links and the system’s 
ground segment. 
Global Hawk air vehicle number one has been located at Edwards Air Force Base 
since August 1997. Air vehicle number two, which is nearing completion, will be 
flown primarily to validate the performance of the system’s sensors and 
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communication systems; its testing will begin at Edwards Air Force Base later 
this year.  
The Global Hawk program is managed by DARPA for the Defense Airborne 
Reconnaissance Office. Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical is the prime contractor. 
Principal suppliers on the contractor team include Raytheon Systems, which is 
developing the ground segment and sensors; Allison Engine Co., which builds the 
aircraft’s turbofan engine; Boeing North American, which builds the carbon fiber 
wing; and L3 Com, which is developing the communication systems.” 18
3.2.3.3 Flight Test Program 
 
The Flight Test Plan initially called for just 16 flights during Phase II because of the relatively 
small flight envelope inherent to the aircraft. In reality, 21 sorties were conducted over 16 
months using two air vehicles. 158 total flight hours were accumulated between February 28, 
1998, and June 11, 1999. AV-1 primarily flew airworthiness sorties, accumulating 12 sorties for 
103 hours. AV-2 primarily flew payload checkout sorties, accumulating nine sorties for a total of 
55 hours. Figure 16 shows the buildup of flight hours. 
Even though the flight envelope of the Global Hawk was fairly small, there were concerns that 
had to be carefully addressed. The Global Hawk is unique relative to the extended amount of 
time that the subsystems are cold soaked at high altitude. Some of these subsystems were COTS 
and were not qualified to the long dwell times at these temperature extremes. Even though the 
Environmental Control System was designed to maintain the temperature and pressure within a 
normal operating environment, a buildup of flight tests involving 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 20 hours 
were conducted to verify that the Environmental Control System was adequate to compensate for 
the long dwell times at the pressure and temperature extremes of high altitude.  
Relative to the overall flight test program, objectives were not met in four of the 21 flights. Of 
the four flights, one dealt with airworthiness and three with payload. In cases where objectives 
were not met, the mission was typically re-flown. In those cases where only a couple of the 
objectives were not met, those objectives were often added to the next mission. 
                                                 
18 News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 2 
March 1998 
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Figure 16. Phase II Flight Program19
Test Responsibilities 
 
Consistent with the new authority resulting from the Section 845 OTA, TRA was given 
significantly increased responsibility over the flight test program. TRA was responsible for test 
planning, test execution, and designation of the Test Director. AFFTC provided assistance for 
safety issues, and ACC provided technical support.   
To ensure an operational flavor in the test program, which was a key element of the ACTD, the 
Test Director at TRA involved the user (31st
CGS 
 Test and Evaluation Squadron [TES]) in nearly all 
aspects of the program. He also involved the JPO in the test planning. 
The CGS consists of the LRE and MCE. LRE 1 was delivered to TRA in November 1996 for air 
vehicle integration testing and then sent to Edwards AFB in October 1997 to support Phase II 
flight testing. MCE 1 was delivered to TRA in October 1997. Subsequently, LRE 2 was 
delivered to TRA in June 1999 and MCE 2 in September 1999. 
CGS performance was always a major concern to the flight test program, since much of the 
Global Hawk capability was embedded into the ground segment. The performance of both the 
LRE and MCE was satisfactory with no significant problems being uncovered. However, 
because of lack of trained personnel and lack of spares, the CGS was never given the opportunity 
to demonstrate its ability to simultaneously control multiple air vehicles. 
                                                 
19 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar, Flight Tests in the HAE UAV ACTD Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, Page 21 
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Comparison to U-2 
In 1997, Air Staff performed a comparison between the Global Hawk and U-2 systems. It was 
already known that the Global Hawk had one significant advantage in that it was designed for a 
minimum loiter time of 24 hours; whereas, the U-2 was only capable of missions in the range of 
8-10 hours. As part of the comparison, Air Staff reviewed the 1997 mission decks for the U-2. It 
was concluded that the Global Hawk could perform 100 percent of all U-2 missions except one. 
For that one case, the Global Hawk could perform about 60 percent of the mission because of 
sensor limitations. The study found that the Global Hawk was better suited for the broad-area 
surveillance mission (of primary concern to DARO) than was the manned U-2 aircraft. The U-2 
required a smaller fleet and had better range on their radar. However, Global Hawk was far 
cheaper, and its lesser sensor capabilities were deemed to meet the needs of the “exploitation” 
community. The Global Hawk sensors, both EO/IR and SAR, were new developments, not 
Government-furnished equipment (GFE). They were much smaller and required much less 
power than the U-2 sensors. However, the Global Hawk sensors were “custom fit,” making the 
sensors harder to replace. The user was pleased with the results and decided that they would 
upgrade the Global Hawk sensor capability later in the program. 
Loss of Air Vehicle 2 
In some ways, the loss of AV-2 never should have occurred. The accident was truly the result of 
multiple coincidences. AV-2 was scheduled to fly the program’s 18th
The investigation that followed concluded that the crash was because of lack of proper 
coordination between Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Edwards AFB, California. The official news 
release that followed stated: 
 sortie on Friday, March 26, 
1999. Unfortunately, the flight had to be aborted. As test lead, TRA elected to re-fly the mission 
on Monday, March 29, 1999. The aircraft experienced an uneventful liftoff from the runway at 
Edwards AFB. As it climbed through 40,000 feet, the air vehicle suddenly and unexpectedly 
flipped over on its back, shut down its engine, and locked the flight controls into a death spin. It 
is reported that the chase plane kept yelling “pull up, pull up,” but nothing could be done. For 
some unknown reason, the air vehicle was given a termination command, and, per design, there 
was no over-ride. The aircraft executed the termination command perfectly and crashed. The loss 
of the air vehicle, including payload, was estimated at $45 million.  
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“The Air Force accident investigation board has released its results concerning the possible 
causes of the March 29 crash of the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle No. 2. 
The mishap occurred when Global Hawk inadvertently received a test signal for 
flight termination from a test range on Nellis Air Force Base, NV, which was 
outside the frequency coordination zone in which the UAV’s mission was being 
flown. This caused Global Hawk to go into a termination maneuver involving a 
pre-programmed, rolling, vertical descent from an altitude of 41,000 feet. 
Global Hawk No. 2, valued at approximately $45 million, crashed at 10:14 a.m. 
PST at the South Range at China Lake Naval Weapons Center, California. When 
it crashed, there was no fire, and China Lake personnel secured the site. 
"While this incident was unfortunate, and caused a temporary delay in our flight 
test program, we resumed flying May 18 from Edwards," said Col Craig 
McPherson, director, Global Hawk System Office, Reconnaissance Systems 
Program Office at Aeronautical Systems Center here. “The flight termination 
approach for Global Hawk has now been modified to prelude the type of incident 
experienced on March 29.” 20
As coincidences sometimes happen, Nellis AFB was preparing for an upcoming exercise 
involving the Global Hawk. By design, the Global Hawk has its own internal termination system. 
However, there was also the capability for an independent termination command transmitted 
from the ground station. As part of the preparation, Nellis AFB was performing a checkout that 
involved sending an independent termination command. When the independent termination 
command was transmitted, it worked flawlessly, and the air vehicle immediately went into a 
controlled crash. 
 
Ironically, the flight resulting in loss of the air vehicle was the last flight scheduled with the 
independent termination system. Had the sortie taken place any time after Monday morning, the 
mishap would never have occurred. Needless to say, the additional independent termination 
system was permanently removed from the air vehicles immediately following that flight. The 
test program did not resume flights until May 18, 1999. 
Some people have questioned whether the test authority given TRA under the Section 845 OTA 
was a factor in this accident. The RAND Corporation, in its contract to assess how the 
acquisition strategy affected program execution and outcome, offered the following insight: 
“One circumstance leading to the destruction of air vehicle 2 was the contractor’s 
decision to re-fly on Monday the sortie that had been aborted three days before. 
Some participants believe that the flexibility to execute the re-flight so quickly 
stemmed from the contractor’s status as lead for test program execution. Others 
believe that the Air Force would have made the same decision and executed the 
same quick turnaround. Most participants stated that the destruction of air vehicle 
2 was not a result of the contractor involvement in the test program because Ryan 
relied on AFFTC for test support in any case. However, the incident report states 
that Ryan did not follow established notification procedures for the revised 
                                                 
20 Results of Global Hawk Accident Investigation Board Released, Air Force News, Sue Baker, Aeronautical 
Systems Center Public Affairs, 23 December 1999 
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mission. Some participants further noted that Ryan had in fact followed these 
procedures and had provided the necessary information to the appropriate office 
at Edwards AFB. Unfortunately, the person who normally handles frequency 
management coordination at Edwards was on leave that day. Other participants 
noted that had the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) been the Responsible 
Test Organization (RTO), it might not have approved the Saturday workload that 
was required to support a Monday flight owing to manning and flight operational 
tempo issues. Considering all of these views, it is not clear if the contractor’s 
designation as lead for test program execution played a role in the loss of air 
vehicle 2." 21
Conclusion of Phase II 
 
Duration of the Phase II flight test program did end up slipping by four months. What was 
originally a 12-month program ended up taking 16 months. Loss of AV- 2 was certainly a player 
in the program slip, but it was not the only source, since the accident actually occurred at the 13-
month point of the flight test program. Earlier problems with sorties not always meeting flight 
test objectives, aborts because of air vehicle failures, etc., all contributed to the slip. As a result, 
Phase II finished in June 1999, 24 months later than the original schedule. The flight test 
program did accomplish the majority of its objectives, demonstrating the airworthiness of the 
system and providing initial characterization of both the air vehicle and its SAR. However, the 
program did not demonstrate the ability of the CGS to simultaneously control multiple air 
vehicles. Likewise, it was unable to perform sufficient tests to characterize the EO/IR sensors, 
since AV-2, which crashed before completing its test objectives, was the only vehicle with the 
EO/IR subsystem installed. 
Change in Program Management Responsibility 
Program Management responsibility was originally planned to transition from DARPA to the Air 
Force at completion of Phase II, which was originally scheduled for July 1997. However, delays 
in completing Phase II resulted in the transition being delayed until October 1998. 
3.2.4 Phase III 
Overview 
The Global Hawk program entered Phase III, the Demonstration and Evaluation (D&E) Phase, in 
January 1999. Phase III focused on obtaining the information necessary for the user to make a 
sound military utility assessment. The bulk of this phase centered on planning and executing the 
D&E exercises. However, some flights were still conducted to support engineering needs. 
Thirteen flights totaling 152 hours were conducted for functional checkout of the air vehicles: 
four flights for AV-3, five flights for AV-4, and four flights for AV-5. In addition, three flights 
totaling 21 hours were conducted for several other engineering purposes, such as validating the 
wing pressure. 
                                                 
21 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar, Flight Tests in the HAE UAV ACTD Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, Page 23 
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D&E Planning 
The D&E IPT Operations Plan was released in September 1997, which documented the 
envisioned Military Utility Assessment process. Both USACOM (the user) and ACC (the TES) 
participated in the IPT. Effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability were the top three 
measures of performance. From these measures, operational issues were derived, exercises were 
defined, and assessment plans were developed. The entire process was documented in the 
Integrated Assessment Plan dated June 1998.  
When Phase III was shortened because of schedule slips in Phase II, USACOM expressed 
concern over the adequacy of the user demonstration, which was now reduced to 12 months. It 
was feared that sufficient information would not be collected to make a definitive military utility 
assessment. 
3.2.4.1 Northrop Grumman Acquires TRA 
TRA was a relatively small aeronautical company. It 
had its roots in 1934 when T. Claude Ryan founded 
the Ryan Aeronautical Company. Its first aircraft was 
the Ryan ST or Sport Trainer, a low-wing, tandem 
seat monoplane. In 1937, a second civilian model was 
introduced, the Ryan SCW-145. This was a larger, 
three-seater aircraft. Interest from the Army Corps 
followed, resulting in the PT-16 (15 built); PT-20 (30 built); PT-21 (200 built); and, finally, the 
PT-22 (1298 built). Following World War II, Ryan expanded its business base to include 
missiles and unmanned aircraft. Some of the more significant unmanned vehicles include the 
Ryan Firebee unmanned target drone and Ryan Firebird (first air-to-air missile). In the 1950s, 
Ryan became a pioneer in jet vertical flight, developing the X-13 Vertijet and, in the early 1960s, 
the XV-5 Vertifan. In 1968, the company was acquired by Teledyne for $128 million, and T. 
Claude Ryan retired.  
In the late 1990s, Northrop Grumman decided to expand their military aerospace business base 
into the area of UAVs. They viewed the acquisition of Teledyne Ryan as a logical choice. 
Teledyne Ryan had a history rich in UAVs, starting with target drones and then progressing into 
missiles. They also had one of the major, up-and-coming Air Force military contracts with the 
Global Hawk. In July 1999, Northrop Grumman finalized a $140 million buy of Teledyne Ryan. 
The acquisition was logically viewed by many as a move designed to bolster Northrop 
Grumman’s presence in the UAV business. Figure 17 is a summary of Northrop Grumman’s 
organizational history. Regarding the buy, Northrop Grumman chairman, Kent Kresa, called the 
acquisition “an excellent strategic fit with many of Northrop Grumman’s business areas and 
strengthens our surveillance and precision strike capabilities.”22
                                                 
22 Northrop Grumman Scoops Up Ryan, Flight International, 6 February 1999 
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Figure 17. Northrop Grumman History23
Northrop Grumman was a much larger company with a rich history in larger aircraft programs. 
Some of the more significant post-World War II programs included the F-5, T-38, F/A-18, F-20, 
and B-2. One of the criticisms of TRA was that it was a small company geared to small drone 
contracts and large contracts where they served as a subcontractor. Some viewed TRA as not 
having the experience and engineering tools required to support a large-scale development/ 
production program the size of Global Hawk. Thus, many within the Air Force viewed the 
timing of the acquisition as a major plus, that the buy-out would strengthen the overall 
acquisition process. Unfortunately, the acquisition did have some negative consequences. Cost 
increased, and the program slowed as new people and processes were introduced. Both 
engineering and production moved into new facilities. With the new production facilities, came 
changes in production processes and tooling. All of this resulted in unavoidable disruption to the 
program. 
 
3.2.4.2 Class A Mishap 
In December 1999, an AV-3 experienced a post-flight Class A Mishap, which is defined as “an 
accident that results in fatality or total permanent disability, loss of an aircraft, or property 
damage of $1 million or more.”24
“On 6 December 1999, at 1617 (0017 Zulu), Air Vehicle RQ-4A Global Hawk 
UAV, S/N 95-2003, accelerated to an excessive taxi speed after a successful, full 
stop landing. The air vehicle departed the paved surface and received extensive 
damage to the electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) sensor when the nose gear 
collapsed. Air vehicle came to rest 150 yards south of runway 22 on Edwards 
AFB. No damage to government or private property, other than the air vehicle, 
 Below are the findings of the Accident Investigation Board, 
which is available to the general public at “http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/index.html.” The site 
contains the Executive Summary for each of the Aircraft Accident Investigations starting with 
FY00. Thus, the site does not contain the summary for loss of AV-2. 
                                                 
23 http:/www.northropgrumman.com/heritage/index.html 
24 USAF Accident Investigation Boards, USAF Judge Advocate General’s Corps, http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ 
AIB_Info.html,  Page 1 
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was sustained. The damage to the air vehicle, including the sensor package, is 
estimated at $5.3 million. Global Hawk AV-3 returned from its ninth flight 
prematurely due to a low temperature condition in the forward avionics bay. The 
most likely cause of this low temperature condition is the fuel bypass valve being 
too far open, cooling the avionics below their design limit. The air vehicle 
transitioned to a preplanned contingency route and returned to base. After the air 
vehicle landed and stopped on the runway, the command and control officer 
commanded the vehicle to taxi. The air vehicle accelerated in an attempt to attain 
the preprogrammed commanded ground speed of 155 knots. 
There is clear and convincing evidence that the primary cause of this mishap was 
the execution of a commanded ground speed of 155 knots for a taxi waypoint on 
the contingency mission plan. The excessive commanded ground speed was 
introduced by a combination of known Air Force Mission Support System and 
Global Hawk Aircraft/Weapon/Electronic software problems. Once the erroneous 
taxi speed was introduced, the mission planning and mission validation processes 
failed to recognize or correct the error. 
The air vehicle autonomously executed the taxi portion of the mission plan, 
ultimately causing it to depart the paved surface. Due to limitations in the Launch 
and Recovery Element, there was insufficient time for the test team to recognize 
the situation and stop the air vehicle prior to it departing the paved surface.” 
The AV-3 mishap, coupled with loss of AV-2, had three significant impacts on the flight test 
program: 1) both mishaps involved loss of the EO/IR sensor, resulting in no representative 
EO/IR imagery being generated during the demonstrations; 2) the demonstration program never 
had two flyable aircraft available at a given time, thus, never permitting multiple air vehicles to 
participate in a given exercise; and 3) the flight test program was shut down for three months.  
AV-3 was repaired and returned to flight status. It became a workhorse of the Global Hawk fleet, 
amassing many sorties. On August 12, 2008, AV-3 was put on display at the National Museum 
of the United States Air Force (NMUSAF) near Dayton, Ohio. According to George Guerra, 
Northrop Grumman Vice President for High-
Altitude, Long-Endurance Systems, “The 
Global Hawk UAV-3 provided unprecedented 
intelligence information to battlefield 
commanders almost continuously since being 
pressed into service in 2001, deploying three 
times in support of the global war on 
terrorism … The men and women who built 
and operated this aircraft take great pride in 
its historical performance, logging more than 
4,800 flight hours, 167 missions and hundreds 
of thousands of images.” 25
                                                 
25 New Global Hawk Exhibit Opens at Museum, Air Force Link, 15 August 2008 
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3.2.4.3 Change in Flight Test Responsibility 
Initially, all program participants accepted the arrangement that TRA would be the RTO, while 
the JPO would accept accident liability and responsibility for contingency planning and accident 
investigation. This arrangement was consistent with Section 845 OTA, whereby the contractors 
are given broader responsibility. However, the AV-3 post-flight taxi accident changed the Air 
Force’s attitude. AFFTC believed that it could no longer ensure safety without being designated 
as the RTO. The Commander of Edwards AFB would not agree to continue flight testing under 
the original structure. Eventually, the issue was resolved at the three-star officer level (EAF/CC 
and ASC/CC), and, on February 7, 2000, AFFTC was designated as the RTO. 
3.2.4.4 Configuration Changes 
As typical of any development program, the Global Hawk design changed as the result of flight 
testing. Generally speaking, the changes were small and did not impact the D&E program. Block 
1 modifications were incorporated into the delivery of AV-4 and AV-5. These included the 
addition of a second radio, as well as improvements to the navigational and fuel systems. AV-1 
was also given the upgrade, as well as AV-3 during its repair following the post-flight taxi 
accident. 
3.2.4.5 Military Utility Assessment (June 1999 through June 2000) 
The Military Utility Assessment was a key element of Phase III. Simply speaking, the purpose of 
the assessment was to determine whether or not the Global Hawk system would provide the 
military commanders with the ability to significantly impact the outcome of combat operations. 
The assessment was conducted by the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) during 
the time period of June 19, 1999, through June 19, 2000. The process included the collection, 
analysis, interpretation, and reporting of data obtained during operational exercises and 
demonstrations. Detachment 1 Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) 
collected the data and provided the results directly to USJFCOM. Representatives from ACC’s 
31 TES participated in the operations and assisted in the collection of data.  
The year-long schedule of events was divided into three progressive stages: crawl, walk, and run. 
The crawl stage was intended to demonstrate the Global Hawk system basic capability. The walk 
stage was designed to begin stressing the system by increasing the operational tempo, number of 
scenes collected, and sortie duration. The run stage was designed to demonstrate the Global 
Hawk’s ability to influence a battle. The demonstration included four air vehicles, three LREs, 
and two MCE stations. All sorties originated from and ended at either, Edwards AFB or Eglin 
AFB, Florida. The primary task during a sortie was to fly the pre-planned mission duration and 
collect imagery data of the target areas identified in the collection plan. 
The Military Utility Assessment consisted of 21 sorties supporting 11 exercises that totaled 381 
flight hours. The exercises supported follow: 
• Roving Sands 1 (June 19, 1999) 
• Roving Sands 2 (June 26, 1999) 
• Roving Sands 2B (June 27, 1999) 
• Extended Range 1-1 (July 15, 1999) 
• Extended Range 1-2 (July 27, 1999) 
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• Extended Range 2/JFEX-Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) (August 30, 1999) 
• CAX 99 − Marine Corps Exercise (September 9, 1999) 
• Extended Range 3-01 Navy Seals (October 4, 1999) 
• Extended Range 3-02 Navy Seals and Close Air Support (October 8, 1999) 
• Extended Range 4-01 Alaska (October 19, 1999) 
• Extended Range 4-02 Alaska (October 25, 1999) 
• Desert Lightning II (November 9, 1999) 
• Desert Lightning II (November 13, 1999) 
• Desert Lightning II (November 17, 1999) 
• Joint Task Force (JTF)-6 Sortie 1 (December 3, 1999) 
• JTF-6 Sortie 2 (December 6, 1999) 
• D&E Deployment to Eglin AFB (April 20, 2000) 
• Linked Seas-1 (May 8, 2000) 
• Linked Seas-2 (May 11, 2000) 
• JTF Exercise (JTFEX)00-1 (May 18, 2000) 
• JTFEX00-2 (May 19, 2000) 
Figure 18 represents the distribution of sorties over time. December 1999 to March 2000 
represents the stand-down time resulting from the AV-3 post-flight accident. 
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Figure 18. Phase III Light Test Program26
Eglin Deployment 
 
The deployment to Eglin AFB and the subsequent participation in the Link Seas and JTF 
exercises were the most eventful sorties of the assessment. The flight to Eglin AFB on April 20, 
2000, provided the Global Hawk with the opportunity to demonstrate to the Coast Guard the 
ability to generate images of the shipping activity in the Gulf of Mexico. It also represented the 
first time that the Global Hawk flew in national airspace. To do so, the JPO worked closely with 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to gain their permission. The FAA had significant 
concerns with a UAV flying over populated areas. Thus, the JPO and Northrop Grumman 
worked closely together to define flight paths that avoided populated areas. 
During the ferry flight from Edwards AFB to Eglin AFB, the air vehicle encountered cold 
temperature problems with fuel in the wing. Since there was no active cooling system on the 
plane, avionics used the fuel in the wing as a heat sink. Unfortunately, the avionics was not 
generating sufficient heat to keep the fuel warm on the extended high-altitude mission. 
Consequently, the team closely monitored the fuel temperature real-time, and the air vehicle was 
just able to complete the flight. To support the subsequent trans-Atlantic flight, the team 
analyzed the fuel temperature as a function of time. One of the interesting facts of science is that 
the cooler the ground temperature, the warmer the temperature at altitude. Since the flight profile 
to Portugal was further from the equator, fuel temperature was not an issue.  
The two exercises that followed the Eglin AFB deployment represented the first trans-oceanic 
flight to Europe and the first mission flown in one theatre of operation while under control from 
another. 
During the Linked Seas exercise, the Global Hawk flew northward from Eglin AFB along the 
east coast, transmitting radar images directly to a ground station located in Fort Bragg, North 
                                                 
26 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar, Flight Tests in the HAE UAV ACTD Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, Page 26 
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Carolina, and to the aircraft carrier USS George Washington stationed in Norfolk, Virginia. One 
of the pictures taken was that of an earthen dam. There is a widely used expression that the 
program was subsequently sold on that one “dam picture.” The air vehicle then continued its 
flight across the Atlantic where it monitored shipping movements. Above Portugal, it gathered 
radar images of an amphibious landing operation near Setubal. The exercise involved the joint 
Services; North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Supreme Allied Command Atlantic; 
its regional command SOUTHLANT; and several NATO countries, including Portugal. The air 
vehicle returned to Eglin AFB 28 hours later.  
During the JTFEX exercise, the Global Hawk flew through three air traffic control zones above 
the Atlantic. It provided direct support for the joint maritime mission of a Navy Carrier Battle 
Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit in a land-sea environment. The Global Hawk returned to 
Edwards AFB on June 19, 2000, concluding the 13-month user demonstration program. 
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Assessment 
The military utility assessment provided very positive conclusions and recommendations. It 
concluded that the Global Hawk did demonstrate a military utility and that it could fly 32-plus- 
hour sorties, collect high-quality SAR images, and complete almost any type of operational 
mission. The assessment recommended the following: 
• Expeditiously field an operational version of the ACTD system 
• Enter the formal acquisition system with Milestone II and Low Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) decisions 
• Use spiral development to upgrade capabilities over time 
• Improve mission planning 
• Provide robust worldwide satellite communications (SATCOM) 
• Aggressively coordinate efforts with the FAA to expand UAV operations.  
The assessment went a long way to convince the naysayers of the potential value of the 
unmanned Global Hawk. The Global Hawk was now seen as a legitimate compliment to, or 
replacement for, the aging U-2. The Global Hawk had demonstrated some advantages over the 
U-2, such as range, endurance and not exposing a pilot to danger. However, as presently 
designed, it did not match 100 percent of the U-2 capabilities. The Air Force was now planning 
to upgrade the second generation of Global Hawks, so the system would be more similar in 
capabilities. 
3.2.5 Phase IV 
The original expectation was that the Global Hawk design would be ready for immediate 
production and operational use at the conclusion of Phase III. However, it was eventually 
realized that the program schedule, budget, and acquisition implementation did not accommodate 
the kind of detailed engineering necessary to support a production go-ahead. For example, 
sufficient flight testing was not conducted to properly characterize the aerodynamic properties of 
the air vehicle. Static and fatigue article testing was not conducted to characterize the airframe 
life. Durability and damage tolerance testing was not conducted to characterize the life of the 
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components. Environmental test data were not available to substantiate the component 
performance for extended periods of time at altitude.  
As a result, sufficient data were not available to define and verify many of the requirements 
necessary for a production decision. The ACTD phase did not result in a validated System 
Specification and corresponding lower-tiered specifications, as required by the Air Force to 
procure and accept future air vehicles. Consequently, a congressional decision was made not to 
pursue production immediately following the conclusion of ACTD. Therefore, Phase IV never 
materialized. 
3.2.6 Summary of ACTD 
Program Cost. Over the duration of the ACTD, the costs associated with specific activities grew 
significantly, but the program took steps to limit the total cost impact to the Air Force. In 
December 1994, the estimate for the Global Hawk portion of the ACTD program, through 
completion of Phase III, was $512 million. The actual cost to the Government was $963 million. 
However, the figures can be misleading in that cost growth was minimized by changing program 
content. For example, of the 10 originally planned air vehicles, only seven were purchased. 
Likewise, fewer sensor payloads were procured, and significantly fewer flight hours were 
accumulated. 
Schedule 
There is no clear, unambiguous end date for ACTD. In reality, there are four possibilities: 
1. Final Phase III flight (July 9, 2000) 
2. Release of the Military Utility Assessment Report (September 2000) 
3. Conclusion of activities put on contract during the ACTD program (February 2001)  
4. Milestone II decision for transition to the formal acquisition process (March 6, 2001) 
Depending on which date is used, the total duration of ACTD was between 69 months (October 
1994 through July 2000) and 77 months (October 1994 through March 2001). Since Phase III 
was originally planned for completion in December 1999, the total slip in final schedule was 
between seven and 15 months. 
Practically speaking, one may argue that the ACTD ended with completion of the flight test 
program, which provided the data necessary for proceeding forward. If one chooses that date, 
then Figure 19 depicts how the key milestones slipped throughout the ACTD. 
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Milestone May 94 Jun 95 Mar 98 Jul 00 
Phase I     
Contract Award Oct 94 Oct 94 Oct 94 Oct 94 
End Date Apr 95 Apr 95 Apr 95 Apr 95 
Phase II     
Contract Award Apr 95 May 95 May 95 May 95 
First Flight Dec 96 Dec 96 Feb 98 Feb 98 
Duration of 
Flight Test Dec 96-Dec 97 Dec 96-Dec 97 Nov 97-Nov 98 Feb 98-Jun 99 
Phase II End Jul 97 Dec 97 Oct 98 Jun 99 
Phase III     
Start Jul 97 Dec 97 Oct 98 Jan 99 
Military Utility 
Assessment Dec 97-Dec 99 Dec 97-Dec 99 Dec 98-Dec 99 Jun 99-Jun 00 
End Dec 99 Dec 99 Dec 99 Jul 00 
Figure 19. Evolution of Key Milestones during ACTD 
Flight Test 
Figure 20 provides a summary of the ACTD flight test program. Of the 21 sorties flown in Phase 
II, 17 fully meet their objectives. Of the 37 sorties flown during Phase III, 26 fully met their 
objectives, five partially met their objectives, and six did not meet their objectives. When 
objectives were not met, the flights were either re-flown, or the objectives were integrated into 
already planned flights. 
Phase AV-1 AV-2 AV-3 AV-4 AV-5 Total 
II 12/103 9/55    21/158 
III 13/225  9/122 11/168 4/39 37/554 
Total 25/328 9/55 9/122 11/168 4/39 58/712 
Figure 20. Summary of Sorties/Flight Test Hours by Air Vehicle and Program Phase 
Acquisition Strategy 
The RAND Corporation, in its study of the ACTD program, attributes six program outcomes to 
the novel acquisition approach. Below is a summary of their findings: 
• “The mission planning was cumbersome and time consuming. The contractors knew at 
the time of the Phase II bid that significantly more funds would be required to make the 
mission planning system suitable for sustained operations. However, because the focus of 
the ACTD was on demonstrating military utility, which at the time was not well defined 
and did not specify timely sortie generation, a conscious decision was made to defer this 
investment. 
• The program lacked sufficient resources both for training personnel and for providing 
adequate spares. This was attributable in part to the reallocation of resources within the 
program to cover increased nonrecurring engineering activity, and in part to a highly 
constrained budget throughout the duration of the ACTD. 
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• The pace of the flight test program was too fast given its cumbersome mission planning 
process and limited resources. Test personnel were clearly overburdened, which appears 
to have been a contributing factor in the air vehicle 3 taxi mishap. 
• The designation of contractors as the lead for flight test direction, planning, and 
execution could have resulted in a failed program. Contractors may not have the 
necessary capabilities, experience, and perspective (culture) to run all aspects of a 
military test program…. 
• The differences in perspective between the ACTD and post-ACTD user communities 
regarding the CONOPS proved to be a serious impediment to the program's transition 
into the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) process…. 
• Differences between the ACTD and post-ACTD user in operational requirements 
definition are also inhibiting the program’s transition to an MDAP. The extent to which 
the capabilities of the ACTD configuration - demonstrated through testing - should 
determine the requirements for a post-ACTD system is the underlying issue. The spiral 
development concept planned for use in the post-ACTD development implies that 
requirements will evolve along with the system’s configuration and block upgrades. As a 
result of this process, early configurations will not have the full capability that ACC, the 
force provider, desires. Initial drafts of the ORD that is required for all MDAPs were not 
wholly reflective of the system’s demonstrated capabilities and subsequent evolution 
based on known shortfalls.”27
UFP 
  
The $10 million UFP covered only the recurring cost of what actually “took to the air.” It was in 
1994 dollars and excluded sustaining engineering, program management, and a host of other 
costs. By the end of Phase II, both the JPO and TRA knew that the $10 million UFP was 
unachievable and would be exceeded by $1 million to $3 million. The program’s sole 
requirement of a $10 million UFP was ultimately abandoned. The reasons for not meeting the 
UFP are numerous, but the following are the dominant ones: 
• There was little or no analytical basis for the UFP. Instead, it was based on what the user 
was willing to pay. 
• The UFP was based on very optimistic assumptions. For example, assumptions relative to 
supplier and manufacturing costs proved unrealistic. 
• The unwillingness of the JPO to strictly enforce the $10 million UFP. In reality, the JPO 
was unwilling to sacrifice major system capability. 
• The $10 million was for a 10-vehicle production of Air Vehicles 11 through 20 and 
assumed a buy of eight vehicles (3 through 10) had been exercised very early in the 
ACTD program. That did not occur. DARPA delayed the program, introduced a gap, and 
effectively abandoned the $10 million plan. 
                                                 
27 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar, Flight Tests in the HAE UAV ACTD Program, Jeffrey A. 
Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, Pages37-40 
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According to one of the RAND reports, “No serious analysis underlay the UFP. To our 
knowledge, this number was not connected to desired Tier II+ or Tier III- capabilities in any 
analytical sense. Instead, we believe that the $10 million UFP was selected because it was judged 
to be high enough to provide a system with meaningful capability if adhered to, yet at the same 
time low enough that the Air Force would be willing to pay for it. The originators of the program 
believed that the price must be set at an artificially low level or the program would be abandoned 
even before it began. The DoD was compelled to use this tactic because of the false notion 
embedded in the Air Force culture that UAVs are inherently less complicated to develop and 
build than manned aircraft with similar capabilities.”28
In reality, the cost of AV1 and the learning curve for AV2 showed the contractor on a reasonable 
track to achieving the $10 million requirement had the Government stuck to the original plan 
(e.g., aircraft buy, requirements, etc.). 
 
Baseline Definition 
The ACTD phase did an excellent job in developing and demonstrating the military utility of the 
Global Hawk system. It participated in 11 combat-type exercises involving 21 sorties and 381 
flight hours. The subsequent Military Utility Assessment Report was very positive and endorsed 
continuation of the program. However, the acquisition strategy called for production 
immediately following Phase III, and the information generated during ACTD did not support 
this approach. System development activities conducted during ACTD were robust and 
supported the objectives of this phase. Pre-flight analyses and tests were comprehensive and 
allowed entry into the flight demonstration phase with acceptable risk. Subsequent flying 
activities demonstrated the considerable performance capabilities of the system. All of the 
contractor-defined design requirements were successfully demonstrated except for engine out 
landing, which was not demonstrated because of a high risk of vehicle loss. This did not 
necessarily mean, however, that a full quantitative engineering characterization of the system had 
been accomplished. For example, a proof test of the wing structure (flight article) to 100 percent 
design limit load (DLL) was conducted; this provided limited substantiation of the design and 
verification of the “as built” product integrity of this specific flight article. However, budget 
considerations did not allow for the conduct of static load testing of a fully instrumented 
dedicated test article to ultimate load (1.25 x DLL) to fully validate the design; nor did they 
permit durability/life testing of the airframe structure or individual components. Likewise, the 
ACTD flights demonstrated the ability of the vehicles to survive and function successfully in 
extreme environmental conditions (e.g., very low air temperatures at high altitude), but no 
service life qualification of subsystems and components using the defined environments was 
accomplished for the same reason. In reality, the contractor wanted to do more testing. For 
example, they submitted a proposal to conduct structural testing to ultimate load, especially on 
the wing, but DARPA was forced to reject it because of lack of funding. As a result of 
programmatic decisions, Phase II and Phase III did not produce a verified set of specifications 
necessary to completely define the product baseline for production; there were no validated 
System Specification, Air Vehicle Specification, or lower-tiered specifications produced in the 
                                                 
28 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar - Their Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator 
Program Experience, Executive Summary, Jeffrey A. Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, 
Page 16 
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ACTD phase. In essence, the successful outcome of the program was impacted by inadequate 
upfront funding.  
Conclusion 
The ACTD phase was categorized as successful. It demonstrated the technology of a UAV 
whose primary mission is to provide overt, continuous, long-endurance, all-weather, day/night, 
and near-real-time wide area reconnaissance and surveillance. However, it did not result in a 
system that was ready to enter production. This was primarily because of customer decisions to 
reduce ACTD program scope and content to stay within cost targets. 
3.2.7 Collier Trophy 
The Robert J. Collier Trophy was established in 1911 with Glenn H. Curtiss 
being the first recipient for his successful development of the hydro-
aeroplane. In 1929, the Collier Trophy was designated as a national award 
honoring those who have made significant achievements in the advancement 
of aviation. The name became official in 1944, with the award being 
presented once a year by the President of the United States. The trophy is on 
permanent display at the National Air and Space Museum. 
The Global Hawk Program was awarded the 2000 Collier Trophy. The trophy was presented on 
May 8, 2001, by Don Koranda, President of the National Aeronautic Association, to the 
Northrop Grumman Corporation, Rolls-Royce, Raytheon Company, L-3 Communications, Air 
Force, and DARPA “for designing, building, testing, and operating Global Hawk, the first fully 
autonomous, operationally demonstrated, and most capable surveillance and reconnaissance 
unmanned aerial vehicle in the world.”  
3.3 Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)/Production Phase 
3.3.1 EMD 
3.3.1.1 Acquisition Strategy 
Definition of Spiral Development 
Spiral development, as the wording implies, addresses the incremental development of a 
capability. Other terms, such as blocks and lots, address the production of the system. Air Force 
Instruction (AFI) 63-123, Evolutionary Acquisition for C2 Systems, Paragraph 4.1, dated April 
1, 2000, describes spiral developments as follows: 
“The spiral development process is an iterative set of sub-processes that may 
include: establish performance objectives; design; code, fabricate, and integrate; 
experiment; test; assess operational utility; make tradeoffs; and deliver. Other 
sub-processes may be added as needed. Spiral development characteristics 
include: a team of stakeholders motivated to collaborate and mitigate risk; a 
development plan and decision process; a process to refine requirements; a firm 
schedule per increment; continued negotiation of performance and cost goals; 
test/experimentation; and a user decision to field, continue development, or 
terminate any portion of the increment. Experimentation, which includes 
simulation and exercises, allows all concept stakeholders to solidify their 
understanding of a concept beyond paper studies or ideas. When strung together, 
spirals facilitate more precise and rapid maturation of new technologies and 
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refinement of user requirements with high operational utility into a complete 
capability for one increment. The key intent is for the system and the fidelity of its 
requirements to evolve together with iterative feedback. Feedback can originate 
from multiple sources including experiments, test and evaluation, the Air Force 
Modernization Planning Process (MPP), radio frequency management, 
operational experience, and user participation.” 
Col. Wayne M. Johnson, Director of the Global Hawk program at the start of EMD, provides a 
simpler definition: 
“But for practical purposes, a spiral acquisition could also be defined as a set of 
acquisition activities incrementally incorporated into an evolving baseline. Each 
increment or spiral increases capability and does so in a rapid pace, with each 
spiral building on the previous spiral and spreading risk and development costs 
over a longer period of time. Each spiral is made up of one or more projects 
developed independently to the maximum extent possible. When each of the 
developments is ready, it is dropped into the production baseline. Testing, both 
internal to the program (DT&E) and external (IOT&E) is done incrementally.” 29
Post-ACTD Planning 
 
Cancellation of the DarkStar program had been discussed by the OSD and Air Force since early 
1998. Post-ACTD planning for the HAE program (Global Hawk and DarkStar) was specifically 
delayed until the fate of DarkStar was decided. Once the DarkStar contractors were ordered to 
cease activity on January 29, 1999, the Global Hawk Program Office was given permission to 
proceed with post-ACTD planning. The planned start date for the next phase coincided with 
release of the Military Utility Assessment and completion of Phase III, which were both 
scheduled for June 2000.  
Guidance for the post-ACTD activities were documented in the Single Acquisition Management 
Plan (SAMP). The initial May 1999 draft did not address many of the programmatic issues, such 
as identifying further development activities, procurement buys (quantities and schedule), and 
continued use of Section 845 OTA. Global Hawk planning as of July 1999 included $420 million 
in the current Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) and $25 million reallocated by Congress to cover 
fourth quarter FY00 post-ACTD activities. 
The post-ACTD activities included a one-year EMD program. This was required to comply with 
the congressional direction contained in the FY99 Authorization Conference Report, which 
required that the Global Hawk complete an EMD phase before entering production. 
Post-ACTD options were requested by both OSD and Secretary of the Air Force (SAF)/AQ. In 
preparation for a July 1999 USD (A&T) program review, the Program Office developed 10 
different options, eight of which were presented at the program review. The options presented 
ranged from buying the existing ACTD configuration with no additional funds beyond those 
already programmed, to a two-year EMD program that would develop and deliver a Block 10 
configuration with a budget increase of $690 million. 
                                                 
29 The Promise and Perils of Special Acquisition: A Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition, Col. Wayne M. 
Johnson, USAF (ret) and Carl O. Johnson, Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 2002, Page 177 
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The program review provided a broad outline of the post-ACTD acquisition strategy. However, 
it did not define the specific structure. Instead, planning would continue with a focus on the three 
options outlined in Figure 21. The review did give the Program Office the approval and authority 
to proceed in defining the details associated with the EMD activities. Unfortunately the Program 
Office had only one year to finalize the details and prepare the required documentation. 
On August 20, 1999, the Intelligence Program Decision Memorandum 1 was released, which 
provided some specific guidance for future program planning. As part of the overall strategy, the 
memorandum required the program to: 
• Buy two air vehicles (AV-6 and AV-7) in FY01 in order to protect the industrial base. 
• Initiate a one-year EMD program in FY01. 
• Initiate production in FY02 at the rate of two air vehicles per year. 
• Use spiral development to satisfy the ORD and address issues identified in the Military 
Utility Assessment. 
 Option 5 Option 6 Option 7 
Cost Increase over FY 
2001 POM $450M $510M $390M 
Duration of EMD 1 year 2 year leading to Block 10 2 year 
Block 5 8 A/Vs + 2 CGSs within FYDP 
2 A/Vs 
Concurrent development 
& production 
N/A 
Block 10 Deferred beyond FYDP 6 A/Vs + 2 CGS within FYDP 
2 A/Vs per year starting in 
FY 03 with 1 A/V prior to 
production units. 
1 CGS within DYDP 
Draft ORD Compliant Block 5 would not meet many requirements 
Block 10 would satisfy 
requirements 
Block 10 would satisfy 
most requirements 
Risk Low-to-Moderate Low-to-Moderate Moderate 
Figure 21. Options Resulting from Decision Memorandum signed July 11, 1999 
In September 1999, the Deputy USD (A&T) proposed a $510 million FYDP plus-up to the 
program to cover a) a one-year EMD program leading to production of Block 5 air vehicles; b) 
production of Block 5 air vehicles; and c) a follow-on EMD program leading to production of 
Block 10 air vehicles. The Air Force was unhappy with the plus-up, because it would come at the 
expense of other programs. Consequently, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff asked for only an 
additional $390 million to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) line for the Global 
Hawk, promising to accomplish the same program content. This decrease in funding would haunt 
the program in the upcoming years. 
The specific configuration of Block 5 and Block 10 remained undefined. The plan was to 
baseline the configuration at the conclusion of EMD, using spiral development. Capability would 
be improved in each subsequent block or spiral upgrade. 
The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was soon developed and briefed to senior Air Force decision 
makers on January 14, 2000. The AoA recommended upgrades to the radar, mission planning, 
common data link, ultra-wideband SATCOM, survivability suite, and supportability. A draft 
ORD was released immediately thereafter, incorporating the AoA recommendations.  
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As of March 2000, the following program risks still remained: 
• “All requirements had not yet been defined; 
• Resource constraints allowed either EMD or contingency deployments, but not both; 
• Funding was insufficient to support concurrent EMD and production; 
• Facility constraints remained in terms of ramping up production rates; 
• Insufficient funding was programmed beyond Spiral 1 (Block 5); 
• Technical training and data may not be complete by Initial Operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOT&E); 
• Program faced potential unavailability of parts due to vanishing vendors; and 
• Systems available for IOT&E might not be production representative.” 30
In November 2000, the Program Office released an approved SAMP for the post-ACTD program 
as depicted in Figure 22. The SAMP included much of the detail previously lacking in earlier 
versions. Several important aspects are as follows: 
 
• Northrop Grumman was given Total System Program Responsibility with Raytheon 
being a subcontractor for the ground segment. 
• Contracts for EMD, Production, and Logistics would be according to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FARs), not OTA. 
• Spiral development would be used at least for Block 5 and Block 10 and would begin in 
FY02. 
• Block 10 would be ORD-compliant and include active electronically scanned array 
technology and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. 
By changing to a traditional FAR-based contract, an extensive list of program documents were 
now required. Below is a list of the more significant documents: 
• ORD 
• Program Management Directive (PMD) 
• Systems Engineering Master Plan (SEMP) 
• Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 
• SAMP 
• Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) 
• Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) 
• Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
• System Requirements Document (SRD) 
                                                 
30 ASC/RAV Early Strategies and Issues Session Briefing, March 2000 
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• System Performance Specification 
• Monthly Acquisition Report (MAR) 
• Cost Performance Report (CPR) 
• Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR) 
• Contractor Cost Data Report (CCDR) 
 
Figure 22. Global Hawk Baseline Program circa December 200031
Configuration Changes 
 
The Block 1 configuration was that of AV-4 and AV-5. The Block 2 aircraft, AV-6 and AV-7, 
were put on contract in December 1999 and were scheduled to be delivered in FY02.  
Spiral 1 (Block 5) aircraft were now scheduled to be delivered in FY03 at a production rate of 
two aircraft per year through FY06. The Spiral 1 upgrades were to include GATM compliance; 
                                                 
31 Innovative Development, Global Hawk and DarkStar, Transition Within and Out of the HAE UAV ACTD 
Program, Jeffrey A. Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, RAND Corporation, 2002, Page 39 
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upgrade of processors for the Integrated Mission Management Computer and SAR; replacement 
of vanishing vendor items; enhanced mission planning to reduce the planning cycle to 12 hours; 
and an open system common data link. By March 2002, ACC identified their Block 5 “must 
dos.” These included a ground moving target indicator, EO/IR sensor characterization, ground 
safety camera, and see-and-avoid/detect-and-avoid equipment. 
Spiral 2 (Block 10) aircraft included major upgrades not funded until the FY01 POM. Block 10 
included a survivability suite, weather detection, electrical power improvements, and sensor 
improvements. 
3.3.1.2 EMD Contract Award 
The Milestone II decision continued to slip for a variety reasons. Finally, in February 2001, a 
favorable decision was rendered. ASC at WPAFB then awarded Northrop Grumman the EMD 
contract for Spiral 1 in March 2001, about five months later than the baseline schedule shown in 
Figure 22.  
Some form of an EMD program was congressionally mandated by the direction contained in the 
FY99 Authorization Conference Report. The Air Force’s approach was to keep EMD to a 
minimum, completing Spiral 1 in just one year. The overall program strategy was to let each 
configuration remain undefined at the start of its EMD and define the baseline at the conclusion 
of its EMD. Capability would be improved in each subsequent block or spiral upgrade. To 
convey some basic set of requirements at the start of the Spiral 1 EMD, a Draft EMD SRD was 
included in the contract. It was a four-page draft document that basically addressed the following 
overall system requirements: 
• Minimum endurance capability to transit 1,200 nautical miles, remain on station for 24 
hours, and return to base 
• Worldwide operation in all classes of airspace 
• Near-real-time mission control, mission monitoring, and mission updates/modifications 
• Capability to satisfy 100 percent of the top-level Information Exchange Requirements 
• ORD requirements for reliability, maintainability, and sustainability 
Because of limited funding and schedule, not all of the ORD requirements were incorporated 
into Spiral 1. One example was the requirement for a single-point refueling system. This 
requirement was subsequently incorporated into Block 20. Unfortunately, delaying incorporation 
of ORD requirements extended throughout the program as requirements originally identified 
(and sometimes funded) for particular Blocks, such as the Weapon System Trainer, were forced 
to be deferred. To address this issue, ACC eventually partnered with the Program Office to form 
the Requirements Planning Working Group. ACC makes the point that they have been accused at 
times of “requirements creep,” but the reality is that they were merely advocating incorporation 
of long-deferred requirements. 
The program’s approach to defining and managing the technical requirements continued to be 
unique. The EMD contract included a draft SRD instead of a System Specification, and the SRD 
did not contain the normal level of detail associated with a System Specification. The intent was 
to evolve to the baseline technical requirements at completion of EMD, thus, providing the 
contractor with greater contractual latitude. Normally, a program would use the contractual 
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System Specification as a basis for the system design and verification accompanying EMD. The 
contractual System Specification is a double-edged sword in that it establishes the minimum set 
of design requirements that the Air Force will use to judge the program’s success/compliance, 
and it protects the contractor against requirements creep. With the baseline not being defined 
until completion of the EMD phase, program risk increases in that either the technical 
performance or cost expectations may not be met.  
Statement of Work (SOW) 
The SOW designated Northrop Grumman as the prime contractor with Total System 
Performance Responsibility (TSPR) for the Global Hawk system, including the air, ground, and 
support elements. It further stated that spiral development was to be used to develop the key 
system improvements, and IPTs would be used in the program management of the tasks. The 
specific non-recurring engineering tasks identified in the SOW included: 
• Worldwide Operations with areas to include tailored GATM requirements and See and 
Avoid requirements 
• Mission updates 
• Capability to retrofit AV-7 in support of testing and validation 
The SOW specifically addressed many of the products directly related to a FAR-based contract. 
For example, the SOW included a requirement for the contractor to prepare and submit a 
Contractor Work Breakdown Structure (CWBS); a CPR, using Northrop Grumman’s Earned 
Value Management System (EVMS); and a CFSR. Also included in the SOW were requirements 
for: 
• An IMS that detailed all activities for the Global Hawk system, including the Air Vehicle, 
Ground, and Support Segments 
• Reliability Analysis 
• Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) Master Plan 
• TOs 
The SOW also contained a requirement for Northrop Grumman to support demonstrations and 
exercises at the direction of the Contracting Officer. Northrop Grumman was required to 
maintain all available air vehicles, ground segments, and support segments in a condition 
suitable for the unspecified flight operations. 
Many of the typical engineering activities associated with a program of this magnitude were not 
specifically mentioned in the SOW. However, some were implied under the Configuration 
Management section, which required that specific documentation be provided in the Program 
Document Library or hard copy. Some of the more significant documents to be included in the 
Program Document Library were: 
• System, Segment, and available lower-tier specifications 
• Interface Control Documents (ICDs) and Interface Definition Documents (IDDs) 
• Software Requirement Specifications (SRSs), Software Design Documents (SDDs), and 
Version Description Documents (VDDs) 
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• System Integration Plans, Subsystem Integration Procedures, and UAV Level Acceptance 
Test Procedures 
• IMP and EVMS Metrics 
• Integrated Logistics Support Data 
Airworthiness Certification, a new Air Force requirement just established in October 2000, was 
only indirectly mentioned through its inclusion in the list of Applicable Documents. 
3.3.2 Production 
In June 2001, just three months after EMD 
contract award, Northrop Grumman was 
awarded a contract for LRIP of two air 
vehicles (P1 and P2) and one MCE. The 
completion date was December 2003. The 
start date represented a three-month slip to 
the schedule shown in Figure 22 and was 
because of a five-month slip in both the 
Milestone II decision and start of EMD. The 
most significant aspect of the acquisition 
strategy was the concurrency of EMD and 
Production. This obviously injected additional program risk and would require careful execution 
and monitoring.  
The production process followed by the Global Hawk program involved the terms “blocks” and 
“lots.” Simply speaking, the relationship between block, lot, and spiral can be explained as 
follows:  
• Spiral refers to the incremental development of a system capability. 
• Block represents a series of aircraft with the same capability. Thus, a given block 
contains a specific spiral (or set of spirals). 
• Lot represents a series of aircraft procured under a given authorization. A lot can involve 
one or multiple blocks of aircraft. 
Figure 23 shows the relationship between blocks, lots, and spirals as ultimately implemented on 
the Global Hawk program. Note that the program dropped the term Block 5 and replaced it with 
Block 10; i.e., Spiral 1 now refers to the capabilities incorporated into Block 10. 
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Figure 23. Relationship between Spirals, Blocks, and Lots32
3.3.3 Supporting Contractors 
 
As with any large contract, Northrop Grumman forged contractual relationships with a multitude 
of subcontractors. The principal subcontractors were as follows: 
• Raytheon Systems for the ground segment and sensors 
• Rolls-Royce for the turbofan engine 
• Vought Aircraft for the carbon-fiber wing 
• L-3 Communications for the communications system 
3.3.4 Australian Deployment 
The EMD contract required that Northrop Grumman support demonstrations and exercises at the 
direction of the Contracting Officer. The first of the demonstrations was a deployment to 
Australia. AV5 made aviation history on April 22-23, 2001, when it flew 7,500 miles non-stop 
from Edwards AFB to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base in Edinburgh, Australia. 
This new endurance record for UAVs was completed in just 22 hours. 
To support the deployment, a ground station and assessment team from the AFOTEC located at 
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, was also sent to Australia. During the deployment, the Global 
                                                 
32 Global Hawk Systems Engineering Plan, Version 1, October 2006, Page 5 
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Hawk flew 11 sorties around the country to demonstrate its reconnaissance and surveillance 
capabilities. The sorties included participation in the Tandem Thrust military exercise in 
Queensland, sorties over Australia's northwest coast, and sorties over Cape York and the 
Northern Territory. 
The RAAF, the Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization, and AFOTEC jointly 
assessed the military utility of the Global Hawk. The assessment focused on interoperability, as 
well as the potential to fundamentally alter the force structure of the Australian Defense Force in 
a cost-effective manner. 
The Global Hawk successfully demonstrated its ability to search large areas and detect/classify 
marine targets. Australian officials also determined that it would be useful for peacetime tasks, 
such as detecting illegal fishing, detecting illegal immigrants, and supporting national disasters. 
After six weeks of operations, the Global Hawk returned to Edwards AFB. The result of the 
deployment was a four-year agreement called Project Agreement 13 to develop the Global Hawk 
as a replacement for Australia’s aging fleet of P-3C Orions. 
3.3.5 Combat Deployments to Southwest Asia 
Operation Enduring Freedom (November 11, 2001, to September 28, 2002) 
9/11 had both a very positive impact in determining the future of the Global Hawk program and 
a negative impact to maintaining cost and schedule. The deployment to Southwest Asia allowed 
the Global Hawk to demonstrate its true value to the warfighter in a real-world scenario. On the 
other hand, it robbed the EMD program of a valuable asset, ultimately costing the program non-
planned dollars and schedule time.  
Immediately following the devastation of the two World Trade Center towers on September 11, 
2001, the Program Office at WPAFB was requested to identify how the Global Hawk could 
support the War on Terrorism. The Program Office, in concert with Northrop Grumman, 
identified how the system could provide an advantage. As a result, AV-3 was deployed to 
Afghanistan in November 2001 to support Central Command’s request for persistent, broad area 
reconnaissance and surveillance. Several members of the Program Office, both military and 
civilian, accompanied the deployment. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the “Global Hawk 
provided the Air Force and joint war-fighting commanders more than 17,000 near-real-time, 
high-resolution intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance images, flying more than 60 
combat missions and logging more than 1,200 combat hours.” 33
To keep the ACTD aircraft functioning, parts for AV-3 were cannibalized from AV-6. The 
ground station segment performed extremely well, giving the commanders a continuous wide-
angle view of the battlefield that was instantly beamed to our Combined Air Operations Center 
in Saudi Arabia. Enemy positions would then be sent to the field commanders and pilots to 
destroy the targets. 
 
In assessing its contribution to the war on terrorism, Lt Col Thomas Buckner, 12th
                                                 
33 HALE Program Overview, History and Accomplishments, Northrop Grumman Website, 
www.northropgrumman.com/ unmanned/globalhawk/overview.html, Page 3 
 Expeditionary 
Reconnaissance Director of Operations, is quoted as saying, “To know it was a technology 
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demonstrator and then to (see) it sent to war is amazing….Global Hawks are in huge demand by 
combatant commanders. We are able to respond and be flexible for the users on the ground.”34 
 
Figure 24. Electro-Optical (EO) Imagery35
Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 18 to April 23, 2003) 
 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Global Hawk flew 15 missions, collecting over 4,800 
images. Even though this represented only 3 percent of all the image collection missions flown, 
it represented 55 percent of the time-critical data on air defense targets. The sole Global Hawk 
“located at least 13 surface-to-air missile batteries, 50 SAM launchers, 300 canisters and 70 
missile transporters; it also imaged 300 tanks, 38 percent of Iraqi’s armored force—a remarkable 
display of the air vehicle’s capability. The Joint Forces Air Component Commander credited the 
Global Hawk with accelerating the defeat of the Iraqi Republican Guard, shortening the duration 
of the war and reducing causalities, exceeding the combatant commander’s expectations.” 36
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force used a reach-back capability whereby the UAV 
and its sensors were remotely operated from Beale AFB, California. This was estimated to 
 
                                                 
34 Prototype Global Hawk Flies Home after 4,000 Combat Hours, Tech. Sgt. Andrew Leonard, 380th Air 
Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, Air Force Link, 14 February 2006 
35 Global Hawk Concept to Combat, Bob Ettinger, National Defense Industry Association 24th Annual National Test 
and Evaluation Conference, 28 February 2008, Chart 16 
36 HALE Program Overview, History and Accomplishments, Northrop Grumman Website, 
www.northropgrumman.com/ unmanned/globalhawk/overview.html, Page 3 
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reduce the Global Hawk logistics footprint by more than 50 percent. The crew used Internet-style 
chat rooms to provide effective C2 over a system that was spread across the globe. 
 
Figure 25. EO Imagery37
3.3.6 Combat Losses 
 
The contribution of the Global Hawk system to the war on terrorism was significant. This was 
amazing considering that the air vehicles were prototypes. However, the fact that they were 
prototypes meant that the system had not been subjected to the normal engineering development 
and test process leading to a production aircraft. Consequently, it was not surprising that two of 
the air vehicles were lost during the deployment. The first loss (AV-5) occurred on December 
30, 2001, and was attributed to a structural failure of the right V-tail and ruddervator assembly 
because of a massive delamination of the main spar in the right V-tail. The second loss (AV-4) 
occurred on July 10, 2002, and was attributed to a fuel nozzle failure in the high flow position 
that eventually led to an engine failure. Below are the findings of the Accident Investigation 
Board, which are available to the general public at “http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/index.html.” 
AV-5 Accident, December 30, 2001 
“On 30 December 2001, at 1222 Local (0822 Zulu), the Mishap Air Vehicle (MAV), RQ-4 
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Serial Number 98-2005, was returning from a truncated 
operational mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom when it departed controlled 
                                                 
37 Global Hawk Concept to Combat, Bob Ettinger, National Defense Industry Association 24th Annual National Test 
and Evaluation Conference, 28 February 2008, Chart 23 
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flight, entering a right spin. There is no spin recovery capability for Global Hawk air vehicles, 
and the MAV came to rest in an uninhabited area approximately 80 miles south of the classified 
Forward Operating Location landing site. No damage to government or private property, other 
than the air vehicle, was sustained. The damage to the air vehicle, including the sensor package, 
is estimated at $40.6 million. 
There is clear and convincing evidence that the primary cause of this mishap was structural 
failure of the right V-tail and ruddervator assembly due to massive delamination of the main spar 
in the right V-tail. 
During the return flight, the right outboard ruddervator actuator control rod failed, allowing the 
ruddervator to travel unrestrained beyond its normal range. The control rod failure was a metal 
fatigue failure induced by a bend in the rod that occurred when it contacted an improperly 
installed actuator nut plate bolt. At 0822Z, while the MAV was descending through 
approximately 54,000 feet above sea level during the second of three 90 degree planned left 
turns, the lift spoilers were fully deployed to assist the descent. Twenty-nine seconds later, the 
MAV departed controlled flight, entering a right spin. 
Once the four lift spoilers were raised to the maximum 45 degree deflection at this altitude, the 
ensuring turbulent air induced violent oscillations and vibrations (flutter) on the unconstrained 
right outboard ruddervator. The energy of the resultant flutter was absorbed by the right V-tail 
main spar, and quickly resulted in delamination of the spar caps and center webbing from the 
root to over one-third the length of the spar. The flexing of the spar and continuing flutter 
eventually caused failure of the double torsion box construction of the right V-tail, further 
subjecting the V-tail to increasing torsion (twisting) loading. The overall result was the structural 
failure of the right V-tail inducing the right spin.” 
AV-4 Accident, July 10, 2002 
“On 10 July 2002, at 704 local (0404 Zulu), the Mishap Aircraft (MA), RQ-4A Global Hawk 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Serial Number 98-2004, was flying an operational mission in support 
of Operation Enduring Freedom when it experience catastrophic engine failure and impacted the 
ground. The MA came to rest in an uninhabited friendly area in the Central Command AOR. No 
damage to government or private property, other than the air vehicle, was sustained. The damage 
to the air vehicle, including the sensor package, is estimated at $40.6 million. 
There is clear and convincing evidence that the primary cause of this mishap was a single fuel 
nozzle failing in the high flow position that eventually caused internal failure of the engine. A 
review of the performance of the engine experienced during the incident flight with the design 
analysis of the combustor with a single fuel nozzle stuck in the open takeoff flow metered 
position is consistent with the hardware distress observed. 
The preflight through the first seven hours of flight was normal. At seven hours and two minutes 
into the mission the air intake fan speed decreased from 90% to 74% and the first fault message 
was received from the on-board computers monitoring the MA. The MA began to descend. 
Multiple Engine Core vibration faults followed and cleared. Approximately 15 minutes later 
Mishap Pilot (MP) 1 directed the MA to return to base when he received a fault message 
indicating that the navigation systems were functioning below acceptable limits. During the 
return to base, MP2 received a status brief and took command from MP1. Two hours and 10 
minutes (0330Z) after the initial fault message, the MA experienced a catastrophic engine 
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failure. The MA glided for another 34 minutes. MP2 attempted to find a suitable landing area 
and executed an emergency landing gear extension. The MA impacted the ground during the 
attempted emergency landing.” 
3.3.7 Spiral 2 
The Global Hawk was viewed as a complement to the U-2 and perhaps even as a replacement. 
The RQ-4A had more range and endurance than the U-2 but less sensor performance based on 
the goal of a low-cost system. In order to enhance the value of the Global Hawk to the 
warfighter, senior Air Force leadership decided that Global Hawk should achieve U-2 parity to 
the maximum extent possible. A decision was made to proceed with a new Block 20 
configuration that would carry both the Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and SIGINT packages 
simultaneously. The Block 10 configuration would remain as an IMINT-only vehicle. As a 
result, the program launched into the Spiral 2 development without a full definition of the design 
requirements for the air vehicle and sensors; that definition would evolve at the end of Spiral 2 
EMD. This represented a radical departure from the 
original acquisition strategy. 
In 2001, a General Officer Steering Group (GOSG) 
recommended developing a larger aircraft in order to 
increase the payload from 2,000 to 3,000 pounds. Later 
that same year, DoD and Gen Jumper, then Chief of Staff, 
Headquarters (HQ) Air Force, designated the Global Hawk 
as a Transformational System, meaning that its capabilities 
were so revolutionary that it would be “fast tracked” into 
production. A one-page list of requirements was quickly 
established. The new and larger RQ-4B was to cruise at 
60,000 feet for 28 hours and carry a 3,000-pound payload.  
In early calendar year (CY)02, the Air Force awarded 
Northrop Grumman two new EMD contracts totaling 
nearly $300 million. According to Northrop Grumman, 
“The contracts, one for $247 million and the other for 
$52.8 million, awarded by the U.S. Air Force will increase 
weight and power in order to enhance Global Hawk’s 
surveillance capabilities. They will cover Stage IIA and 
Stage IIB engineering and manufacturing development.” 38
Coincidently with the finalization of the Spiral 2 acquisition strategy, the Air Force held a series 
of senior management meetings in the fall and winter of 2001/2002. The meetings were focused 
on jump starting the acquisition process. Then SAF, James Roche, wanted to foster a culture of 
innovation and reasonable risk taking that would result in the shortening of acquisition cycle 
times. The objective was to deliver today’s technology today. Secretary Roche wanted a flexible 
system that would allow the rapid insertion of new technologies throughout a system’s life-cycle. 
His ultimate goal was to build credibility with the customer, the warfighter. Then Assistant SAF 
for Acquisition, Marvin Sambur, was given the responsibility for implementing the concept. Mr. 
 
                                                 
38 Northrop Grumman Awarded Two Contracts for Global Hawk totaling $300 Million, Northrop Grumman News 
Release, 1 April 2002 
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Sambur established what was called the Agile Acquisition Initiative that was based on the simple 
premise of the responsible parties working together. The four parties were the requirers, the 
technologists, the testers, and the acquirers. There were three sub-initiatives that comprised the 
Agile Acquisition Initiative: 
1. Collaborative requirements process whereby the warfighter would no longer toss their 
requirements over the wall and let the other team members try to translate their needs into 
a contractual document. Instead, the four parties would work as a team from the start, 
with the technologists and acquirers providing immediate feedback to the requirer on 
technology and development issues. The testers would be involved to ensure that the 
requirements could be verified. 
2. Focused technology transfer would address whether or not the required supporting 
technology was available. The objective was to have the laboratories realign their limited 
resources to focus on bringing high-value technology to a higher technology readiness 
level in a time consistent with the new weapon systems. 
3. Seamless verification whereby the testers were engaged early, so they could provide their 
expertise on testability of requirements was used. The objective was to remove the 
“seams” between development testing and operational testing. 
In order to test the Agile Acquisition Initiative, Mr. Sambur established the Pathfinder program 
in March 2002.39 There were six programs chosen “that could blaze a path for others to follow, 
very much like our Pathfinder forefathers…all with a bottom line goal of building credibility 
within and outside the acquisition community and reducing cycle time by a ratio of 4:1.” 40
The Global Hawk was one of the six Pathfinder programs selected. In an effort to deliver the 
Global Hawk capability to the warfighter in the shortest time possible, the Air Force restructured 
the program, expanding development by five years, while compressing production by nine years. 
Originally, program funding was spread almost evenly across 20 years. With the restructured 
program, funding was compressed into roughly half the time, sometimes tripling the budgetary 
requirements in specific years. Figure 26 shows the funding profile. This restructuring resulted in 
significant concurrency between development and production during FY04 through FY10 (see 
Figure 27). The concurrency meant that the Air Force would invest in almost half of the new, 
larger air vehicles before the production configuration was validated through flight testing. 
Likewise, full rate production would begin before the SIGINT (Block 30) and multiplatform 
radar (Block 40) configurations completed development and flight testing. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Interview with Marvin Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition): Pathfinder Program Testing 
the Potential of Spiral Arms Development, P. L. Croise, PM, July-August 2003, Page 6 
40 Ibid, Page 6 
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Figure 26. Global Hawk’s Annual Funding Requirements41
 
 
                                                 
41 GAO-05-6, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce 
Program Risks, Government Accountability Office, November 2004, Page 8 
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Figure 27. Concurrency of Development and Production42
The first contract, dated February 28, 2002, was for the lesser amount ($52.8 million) and 
addressed Spiral 2A. The updates in air vehicle capability, which were targeted for Lot 2, 
included: 
 
• 25 KVA ac generator, replacing the existing hydraulically powered motor generator 
• Increased capacity Environmental Control System to support increased payload 
capability and additional electrical power generation 
• Rain Intrusion System to inhibit rain penetration into the interior compartments of the air 
vehicle 
The second contract, dated March 25, 2002, was for $247 million and addressed Spiral 2B. It 
was also targeted for Lot 2. This spiral added an EISS (EO/IR/SAR sensor) and focused on the 
air vehicle changes necessary to support the larger 3,000-pound payload. For example, the 
fuselage was made larger, and equipment was rearranged, so the air vehicle could carry six of the 
seven Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) avionics boxes that the U-2 can carry. To 
offset the loss in stability and control from the increased fuselage volume, vertical fin size was 
increased. To retain air vehicle performance, additional fuel was added, and the span of the wing 
                                                 
42 ibid, Page 11 
 
Global Hawk Systems Engineering Case Study 
 
 
Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFIT/SY) 
Air Force Institute of Technology  
 Page - 65  
ID 8844  
 
was increased. To improve laminar flow over the wing, manufacturing processes were modified 
to maintain tighter tolerances on curvature of the airfoil. The COTS engine was upgraded with 
improved turbine materials to provide either more thrust or a longer duty cycle before teardown 
and refurbishment. The performance gains hoped for were not fully realized, and aircraft 
performance suffered. Maximum altitude was reduced from 65,000 feet to 60,000 feet, but 
endurance remained at about 30 hours, which was comparable to the Block 10.  
Figure 28 is a performance comparison of the two Global Hawk configurations, while Figure 29 
provides a physical comparison. 
Characteristics RQ-4A RQ-4B 
Payload 2000 pounds 3000 pounds 
Take-Off Weight 26,750 pounds 32,250 pounds 
Endurance 31 hours 33 hours 
Time at 60,000 feet 14 hours 4 hours 
Average Speed @ 60,000 feet 340 knots 310 knots 
Approximate Range 10,000 nautical miles 10,000 nautical miles 
Figure 28. Performance Comparison 
 
 
Figure 29. Physical Comparison of RQ-4A (Block 10) and RQ-4B (Block 20) 
The SOW contained in Spiral 2B did include two significant additions. First, it included a 
specific task for Airworthiness Certification. The second significant addition was the 
requirement to develop and qualify an architecture that would provide functional and physical 
separation of flight and mission critical functions, including software. This change is one that 
would be critical to obtaining Airworthiness Certification. 
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Airworthiness Certification 
In 1994, then Secretary of Defense William Perry directed the military services to begin 
reinventing the acquisition process. A key element of the “Perry Initiatives” was a major 
reduction in the use of MIL-SPECs and military standards (MIL-STDs) in the acquisition 
process. Up to this point in time, the military qualified their weapon systems to an extensive set 
of contractual MIL-SPECs and MIL-STDs. Once qualified, the system was considered 
airworthy. However, with the major reduction in the use of specifications and standards, there 
was no comprehensive set of requirements to judge that an aircraft was safe to fly. This void in 
our acquisition process led to the formulation and release of Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 
62-6, USAF Aircraft Airworthiness Certification, dated October 1, 2000. This AFPD established 
the requirement that each aircraft configuration undergo a formal airworthiness certification 
process. On October 1, 2002, the Air Force released Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK-516), 
Airworthiness Certification Criteria, which established the criteria to be used in determining the 
airworthiness of a given aircraft.  
The Air Force airworthiness process can be summarized as a three-step process: 
1. Development and approval of a Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria (TACC) 
document for use as the basis of certification. MIL-HDBK-516 defines the criteria to be 
tailored. 
2. Design evaluated against the criteria contained in the TACC, using a combination of 
analysis, laboratory, simulator, flight, and demonstration data to verify compliance. 
3. All non-compliances assessed for operational safety risks and all identified risks accepted 
by the appropriate authority. 
The process is controlled by the ASC Airworthiness Board at WPAFB, and the TACC requires 
coordination of the functional experts within the ASC Engineering Directorate. 
Unfortunately, Spiral 1 contract award was 19 months before release of MIL-HDBK-516. To 
complicate things even further, the sole reference in the Spiral 1 SOW to Airworthiness 
Certification was in the list of Applicable Documents, where the AFPD was simply referenced. 
Consequently, the SOW failed to include any specific taskings for airworthiness certification, 
and the corresponding systems engineering effort was never costed. This resulted in the 
necessary steps not being adequately reflected in the initial program planning.  
The program learned from its error, and the Spiral 2 SOW did include a taking for Airworthiness 
Certification, which was a step in the right direction. However, the SOW tasking only required 
that the effort satisfy “the airworthiness criteria as specified in the tailored airworthiness criteria 
document.” There was no mention of MIL-HDBK-516 or the specific document revision. In 
reality, the contract could not specify MIL-HDBK-516, since the Spiral 2B contract was signed 
on March 25, 2002, which was six months before release of MIL-HDBK-516.  
When the program began to prepare their TACC document for the Block 20 configuration, MIL-
HDBK-516B Expanded was in effect. However, the program was using the initial version of 
MIL-HDBK-516 for Block 10 certification. Northrop Grumman warned the Program Office 
several times that the airworthiness criteria and verifications had sometimes changed from the 
Block 10 TACC and that it would result in a cost risk. Driven by Air Force policy, the Program 
Office remained firm in the use of MIL-HDBK-516B Expanded. It was not until the design was 
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about 80 percent complete that the issue was finally resolved; that MIL-HDBK-516B would be 
used as the basis for Airworthiness Certification. This issue could have been avoided had there 
been a contractual System Specification that defined the specifics for airworthiness certification. 
Functional and Physical Separation of Flight and Mission Critical Functions 
This addition attacked only a portion of the systemic problem associated with software. The 
Northrop Grumman Team did not have the experience with the standard software process 
required by typical Air Force programs. The Air Force has defined a series of best practices 
deemed necessary to efficiently and successfully develop, manage, and deliver a software 
package. The processes have been documented in various forms over the years. Some of the 
sources include: 
• DoD 5000.2, Part 6-D, Computer Resources, which addresses Computer Resources Life- 
cycle Management Plan, Integrated System Development, software metrics, software test 
management, and software engineering practices 
• Air Force Regulation 800-14, Life-cycle Management of Computer Resources in Systems 
• ASC Pamphlets on Software Integration, Verification and Validation, Software Risk 
Abatement, Review of Software Requirements and Interface Requirements Specification, 
Software Management Indicators, Software Quality Measurement, and Software 
Development Capability Assessment 
• SAF/AQ Memos on Software Engineering, Software Maturity Assessment, Metrics, 
Software Estimating, Software Reuse, and Best Practices 
• Development Standards, such as DoD-STD-2167/2168, MIL-STD-498, and MIL-STD-
1803 
The criticality of the flight control system, both the hardware and software, had always been an 
issue between the Program Office and Northrop Grumman. The Air Force always classifies the 
flight control system, including both the hardware and software, as Safety Critical. As a result, 
the flight control system of most Air Force air systems is typically multiple redundant, whereas it 
is only single redundant on the Global Hawk. When the Program Office challenged the 
contractor on the issue of how they treated the flight control software, the contractor responded 
by stating that they treated everything the same. However, that approach did not reflect the Air 
Force’s established process for safety critical functions. Even though the SOW tasking to 
separate the flight critical functions from the non-flight critical functions was a step in the right 
direction; little changed. Also, the update to the SOW did not address the systemic problem of 
requiring the contractor to develop an approach consistent with current Air Force practices. The 
team’s lack of a sound process contributed to both cost and schedule overruns.  
Even though the software process did not meet the Air Force’s recommended practices, Northrop 
Grumman did have a consistent process within their company team. However, the processes 
differed between the prime and each of the suppliers. There was no one Northrop Grumman lead 
for overall software development on the Global Hawk system; there was a lead at Northrop 
Grumman and a lead at each of the subcontractors. This was a carryover of the ACTD culture, 
which hurt the development of an integrated product. 
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Relative to software validation, testing was never automated. Thus, qualification of a full 
Operational Flight Program (OFP) software package would take over three months. Northrop 
Grumman did emphasize System Integration Testing, and they did it quite well. They 
emphasized this testing, since the software process was lacking. Unfortunately, because of 
funding constraints, the suppliers did not have the test assets necessary to perform integration 
testing. Therefore, many of the supplier software deficiencies were not caught until they were 
tested at Northrop Grumman at the overall system level. When that happened, the software 
would typically be returned to the supplier for correction, thus, delaying the testing. In 2005, the 
program did implement Integrated Functional Capability (IFC). IFC now defines the 
functionality of the hardware/software associated with a given software release. This was an 
initial step in implementing the Air Force “best practices” for software development. 
Late in 2004, the Program Office conducted a quick program review by recalculating their cost 
estimate based on an identification of known risks. In performing the cost estimate, the Review 
Team ascertained that the software was grossly underestimated in terms of both cost and 
schedule. Consequently, in April 2005, the Program Office conducted a Software Executability 
Review, with participation from ASC/EN at WPAFB. The team addressed the contractor’s cost 
estimating practices, schedules, etc., and confirmed the earlier findings. 
3.3.8 Organizational Structure 
About two years into EMD/Production, Northrop Grumman reorganized. The program managers 
were aligned by major contract (e.g., Development, Production, Supportability, and 
Sustainment), while the Technical IPTs became the execution teams responsible for building the 
system. The program managers apportioned funds to these IPTs to work a particular task related 
to their contract. The Technical IPTs were aligned by Air Vehicle, CGS, and Payload. There 
were also sub-IPTs, e.g., Software, Test, Systems Engineering, Product Support, Ground 
Segment, etc. Each IPT had a designated Government counterpart. With the reorganization, the 
systems engineers were all centralized in a Systems Engineering Integration Team (SEIT). 
Removing the systems engineers from the IPTs was perhaps the result of a combination of 
several factors: a desire on the part of the Air Force to field the system as quickly as possible, a 
perception that very little additional development was required because of the success of the 
ACTD program, and a reluctance on the part of the user to fund tasks that were viewed as not 
contributing directly to operational capability development. As a consequence, the Government 
did not provide the necessary program definition and funding for these aspects of an EMD 
systems engineering program, and the contractor had little choice but to follow the customer- 
mandated approach. The result was that the SEIT was viewed by the IPTs as a “non-value 
added” activity and as a watch dog that imposed workload that detracted from the IPT’s ability to 
accomplish required tasks; consequently, the SEIT had very limited ability to successfully 
impact the conduct of the program. This is supported by the point that, when funding problems 
drove program cutbacks, systems engineering proved to be an easy target.  
The System Program Office (SPO) IPTs were aligned according to the contract. Consequently, 
there was a Development IPT, a Production IPT, and an Integration IPT, which included the 
SEIT. The Government IPT structure resembled how the contractor’s program managers were 
aligned, not how their technical IPTs were aligned. This mismatch hindered SPO involvement 
with the contractor IPTs. Generally speaking, the SPO did participate on the contractor’s IPTs, 
but differences between the IPT alignments made counterpart relationships difficult at times. 
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3.3.9 Navy Global Hawk 
Even though the Global Hawk was an Air Force-managed program, there was always the 
expectation that the system might also fill a critical role with the Navy. During ACTD, the Navy 
was a member of the JPO. As the Air Force program progressed, the value to the Navy was seen 
to increase. Thus, in February 2003, the Navy awarded Northrop Grumman a contract for the 
Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) program. The contract involved modifying two 
Global Hawk air vehicles, as well as the associated ground and support segments. The contract 
was awarded and managed by ASC at WPAFB on behalf of the Navy. The objective of the 
contract was to integrate maritime sensors into two Block 10 Global Hawk air vehicles and 
demonstrate that the resultant system would provide a high-altitude, long-endurance surveillance 
capability that met the Navy’s critical requirements. The program was designed to leverage off 
the Air Force contract in the procurement of the air vehicles and associated ground control and 
support segments. 
The Navy took delivery of their system in CY05. The naval configuration was originally tested at 
Edwards AFB for several months and then ferried to the Naval Air Station (NAS), Patuxent 
River, Maryland, for the GHMD program.  
In the spring of 2006, the system participated in a maritime 
drug interdiction surveillance demonstration, completing four 
sorties over the Caribbean and the coast of Florida. It located 
and identified numerous airborne and surface targets. The 
aircraft then flew in the Rim of the Pacific exercise in July. 
Although the operations were in the vicinity of Hawaii, the 
aircraft was operated from Edwards AFB, requiring flights to 
and from California for each demonstration. Four different 
sorties were involved, resulting in over 24 hours of maritime 
surveillance coordinated with the USS Abraham Lincoln and 
Bonhomme Richard. The sorties involved maritime situational awareness, contact tracking, and 
imagery support of various exercises. The imagery was transmitted to Patuxent River for 
processing and forwarded to the fleet operations off Hawaii. (See RQ-4N) 43
Ultimately, Northrop Grumman entered a version of the RQ-4B into the Navy Broad Area 
Maritime Surveillance UAV contract competition. On April 22, 2008, the Navy awarded 
Northrop Grumman the contract worth $1.16 billion. 
 
3.3.10 Production Lots 2 and 3 
In February 2003, Northrop Grumman was awarded a $302.9 million fixed-price-incentive-fee 
contract for LRIP of Block 10 aircraft. The contract included delivery of four Block 10 air 
vehicles, three ISSs, two EO/IR sensors, and one LRE. Also included were two Block 10 air 
vehicles, two ISSs, two LREs, and one MCE for a planned 2005 maritime demonstration by the 
Navy. The last Lot 2 air vehicle was delivered in April 2006. 
In June 2003, the Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman a $30.1 million follow-on contract to 
provide the long-lead parts and advanced procurement necessary to support a subsequent Lot 3. 
Work was scheduled for completion in February 2004. In April 2004, the Air Force awarded 
                                                 
43 Northrop Grumman to Demonstrate Global Hawks for Maritime Watch, Space Daily, 13 February 2003 
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Northrop Grumman the subsequent $202 million contract for Lot 3 LRIP. Lot 3 was a mixed buy 
involving one Block 10 air vehicle with sensor suite, one Block 20 air vehicle with sensor suite 
and SIGINT clip-in kit, two Block 20 air vehicles with SIGINT clip-in kit, one LCE, one MCE, 
and one basic sensor suite.  
3.3.11 German Demonstration 
During the ACTD phase, Germany followed the 
development of the Global Hawk system closely. Their 
aging fleet of Brequet Atlantique SIGINT aircraft based at 
Nordholz was due for replacement by 2008. The success of 
the ACTD program led the European Aeronautical Defense 
and Space (EADS) Company to sign an agreement with 
Northrop Grumman in July 2000 to develop an unmanned 
wide area surveillance and reconnaissance air vehicle.  
In July 2002, the Air Force and German Ministry of Defense (MoD) successfully completed 
preliminary compatibility testing of the EADS electronic intelligence (ELINT) payload with the 
Global Hawk at Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Systems facility in San Diego. This was 
followed by a flight demonstration in November 2002 at Edwards AFB. During the flights, the 
ELINT sensor detected radar transmissions from emitters located at the Naval Air Warfare 
Center (NAWC) at China Lake, California. Transmissions were sent through the line-of-sight 
communications link to a German ground station temporarily located at Edwards AFB. 
The successful integration of ELINT into the Global Hawk 
led Northrop Grumman to conduct a series of demonstration 
flights in Germany for the German MoD. On October 15, 
2003, the first prototype Block 10 flew a 21-hour trans-
Atlantic flight from Edwards AFB to Nordholz, Germany. 
The air vehicle was then based at Nordholz from October 15 
to November 6, 2003, flying six demonstration sorties over 
the North Sea for a total of 29 flight hours. The ELINT 
sensor successfully enabled the Global Hawk to detect and 
classify electromagnetic signals from aircraft, ships, and land-based systems. The air vehicle was 
able to detect the type of radar emitting from each source.  
The highly successful demonstration led to a decision by the German MoD to award a $430 
million contract to EuroHawk GmbH, a joint venture company formed by EADS and Northrop 
Grumman Corporation. The contract, which was awarded 
on January 31, 2007, was for the development, test, and 
support of the Euro Hawk unmanned signal SIGINT system. 
The system will provide stand-off capability to detect 
electronic ELINT radar emitters and communications 
intelligence emitters. EADS will provide the ground stations 
required to receive and analyze the data from the Euro 
Hawk. Delivery of the first demonstrator is scheduled for 
2010 with the next four scheduled between 2011 and 2014. 
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3.3.12 Block 10 Flight Test 
Rollout of the first production Block 10 air vehicle took place at the Northrop Grumman 
manufacturing facility in Palmdale, California, on August 1, 2003. The air vehicle made its 
maiden flight the following summer (July 2004) when it flew from Palmdale to the Flight Test 
Center at Edwards AFB. The four-hour flight went flawlessly.  
One interesting program note is that it was not until about a month before the Air Force took 
possession of the first Block 10 air vehicle that the Program Office took action to develop an Air 
Vehicle Specification. The air vehicle had been designed to a set of requirements, but they were 
fluid and non-contractual. For the Air Force to accept the air vehicle, the Program Office needed 
a specification to base its acceptance. Thus, an Air Vehicle Specification was written to match 
what the current configuration was capable of achieving. 
Since the program was now ready to move beyond the advanced concept demonstrator phase, the 
program decided to pursue a Certificate of Authorization (COA) for operation in national 
airspace. In August 2003, the FAA granted the Air Force a COA to routinely operate the Global 
Hawk in national airspace. Before the COA, the FAA would grant the Global Hawk access to 
national airspace only in several FAA regions in order to support specific exercises. This 
certification was significant, since it represented the first national COA granted for a UAV. 
The Block 10 air vehicle began its 15-month-long operational flight test in August 2005. Testing 
was conducted at Edwards AFB by AFOTEC Detachment 5, 31 TES, and 452nd
The test program began with a Pre-Deployment Assessment, which was conducted on August 
22-28, 2005, at Beale AFB. Capabilities evaluated included flying operations; EO, IR, and SAR 
sensor functionality; and quality, timeliness, and usefulness of sensor imagery. Representative 
sorties were flown to emulate the types of sorties to be flown in a real-world combat 
environment. The first two sorties lasted more than 28 hours each, while the final sortie lasted 
almost 14 hours. The test team then proceeded with the deployment phase of the operational test 
program in April 2006. The Global Hawk system, along with the test team, deployed to various 
locations worldwide. Deployments included locations with the Army and Marine Corps units in 
theater to assess how well the Global Hawk system would satisfy the warfighter’s needs. The test 
program also included a deployment to the east coast to evaluate sensor performance in dense 
foliage and evaluate the system interoperability with ground units involving the Army’s 513
 Flight Test 
Squadron (FLTS). The purpose of the tests was to determine if the Block 10 configuration was 
ready for deployment.  
th
At completion of the operational test program on November 17, 2006, Maj Gerhardt, Global 
Hawk Test Director with AFOTEC Detachment 5, concluded the following: “Global Hawk is the 
premier unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft for this generation 
warfighter. This assessment will lay the ground work for future Global Hawk testing of Blocks 
20, 30, and 40.” 
 
Military Intelligence Brigade.  
44
                                                 
44 AFOTEC Det. 5 Leads Conclusion of First Global Hawk Operational Testing, Airman 1st Class Julius Delos 
Reyes, 95th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, 1 December 2006 
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3.3.13 Airworthiness Certification of Block 10 
Being the first program to seek Airworthiness Certification of a UAV was no easy task. The 
situation was compounded by the fact that Airworthiness as a distinct task separate from the 
typical system development/performance verification activity was a new concept with AFPD 62-
6 just established in October 2000. AFPD 62-6, USAF Aircraft Airworthiness Certification, was 
not released until October 1, 2000, just five months before Spiral 1 EMD contract award. MIL-
HDBK-516, which established the criteria to be met, was not released until October 1, 2002, 19 
months after Spiral 1 contract award.  
In developing the TACC, the Program Office used the original version of MIL-HDBK-516. 
Approximately 560 criteria contained in MIL-HDBK-516 were deemed applicable. Since a 
comprehensive effort to fully characterize the system performance and characteristics was not 
included in the EMD contract, the program had to rely on the limited set of activities 
accomplished during the ACTD phase. This resulted in 70 of the 560 criteria being assessed as 
non-compliant. To address the non-compliances, the Program Office placed the 70 non-
compliances into 40 different “buckets” of risk. Less than 20 of these “buckets” were classified 
as Moderate Risk per MIL-STD-882 (Department of Defense Standard Practice for System 
Safety). As a result, Block 10 was given a Restricted Certificate of Airworthiness on January 25, 
2006. The restriction involved avoiding populated areas to the maximum extent possible. In a 
News Release, Northrop Grumman stated, “RQ-4A Global Hawk reconnaissance system is the 
first unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to achieve a military airworthiness certification…The 
military airworthiness certification process is very rigorous and has taken three years and 77,000 
man-hours to achieve.” 45
3.3.14 Nunn-McCurdy Breach and Recertification 
 
The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment was first introduced in the 1982 Defense Authorization Act 
and was made permanent in 1983. The amendment was designed to curtail cost growth in our 
military weapon procurements. Appendix 3 of this case study contains a copy of the amendment. 
Simply speaking, the amendment requires that the Pentagon notify Congress when cost growth 
on a major acquisition program reaches 15 percent. If the cost growth reaches 25 percent, then 
the Pentagon must recertify the program based on the following criteria: 
1. System is essential to the national security, 
 
2. There are no alternatives to the system that will provide equal or greater military 
capability at less cost, 
3. New estimates of total program unit cost or procurement unit cost are reasonable and/or, 
4. Management structure for the system is adequate to manage and control the total program 
acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost. 
Rarely is a program cancelled under this law. However, the recertification results in numerous 
program improvements and Congress typically accepts the Secretary of Defense’s recertification.  
                                                 
45 Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk UAV Achieves Military Airworthiness Certification: A First for 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Revelle Anderson, Northrop Grumman News Release, 13 February 2006 
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3.3.14.1 Circumstances Leading to Breach 
As the saying goes, hindsight is 20-20. In retrospect, there were a number of factors that 
ultimately contributed to the breach. The prominent ones as defined by the interviewees in this 
study include the following: 
1. The seed for the breach on the Global Hawk program was the Air Force decision to 
develop the larger Block 20 aircraft. The user identified the need for additional 
capabilities, which resulted in a larger payload aircraft. When the decision was made to 
pursue the larger aircraft, no one fully appreciated the extensiveness of the change, and 
this led to cost increases. For example, the decision-makers did not realize that the wing 
needed to be larger, the empennage redesigned, and the landing gear strengthened to 
accommodate the heavier take-off and landing loads. Likewise, only about 20 percent 
of the RQ-4A drawings were applicable as opposed to 80 percent as originally 
projected. These discrepancies were largely because of the contracts containing no pre-
EMD engineering development activities for the next spiral. 
2. The user had specific performance requirements that needed to be met, and these were 
not necessarily consistent with available funding. The result was a choice of “the 
devil’s alternative”: either breach the program cost ceiling or fail to meet the user 
requirements. The program chose to meet the user requirements. 
3. Customer direction and funding did not support the conduct of Spiral 1/Block 10 
development of full engineering characterization activities, which had not been 
accomplished during ACTD. 
4. The program lacked a single IMS. There was a SOW tasking to create and maintain an 
IMS that depicts program interdependencies and critical paths. Implementation of this 
tasking resulted in a multitude of IMSs: one for each Spiral and one for each of the Tier 
2 IPTs. In some cases, the IMSs were merely created and maintained in PowerPoint, 
while others were created and maintained in Microsoft (MS) Project. The IMSs were 
typically independent of each other, and there was no overall program attempt to 
integrate the IMSs through a single IMS that showed the interdependencies and critical 
paths. 
5. TRA was an excellent choice for an ACTD type of program where there were few 
Government rules and regulations resulting from the use of Section 845 OTA. 
However, the EMD and Production contracts were FAR-based, requiring 
implementation of the extensive set of Government rules and regulations governing a 
military acquisition program. TRA did not have the experience associated with a much 
larger EMD program accompanied by these types of controls. The appropriate 
processes were not in place, and this contributed to cost overruns. 
6. Concurrency was a major contributor to the problem. Production contracts were 
awarded based on the design currently available without any effort allotted to refine and 
validate the design. For example, the EMD initial contract was awarded in March 2001, 
and the contract for the first two Block 10 LRIP air vehicles were awarded just three 
months later. The user’s attitude was: “We want what is out there.” There was no well- 
defined baseline for each block of aircraft and no rigor for identifying and correcting 
shortfalls. In essence, the team was proceeding with an air vehicle configuration whose 
foundation was not truly understood. 
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7. The program was not prepared for the logistics support associated with the multitude of 
air vehicle configurations. 
8. Airworthiness as a distinct task separate from typical system development/performance 
verification was a new concept with the AFPD just established in October 2000 and the 
corresponding MIL-HDBK-516 not released until October 2002. For Spiral 1, no 
airworthiness tasking was included in the SOW, and the cost of the effort was not 
projected. For Spiral 2, the contractor assumed that the same initial version of MIL-
HDBK-516 used for Block 10 would also be used for Block 20. However, Air Force 
policy required that the latest version be used. The resultant ambiguity led to a late 
resolution that MIL-HDBK-516B Expanded would be used for the Block 20 
certification. This required Northrop Grumman to generate or provide documentation 
that was not in their database and, in some cases, redesign components or structure to 
comply with the new handbook. 
9. The contractual performance requirements that existed were minimal (more typical of 
an ACTD program) and were documented in the SOW. The SOW is a program 
document defining tasks to be performed, not a specification. The program failed to 
require a contractual System Specification typical of a military acquisition program. As 
a result, requirements were loosely defined, and new requirements were added based on 
operational experience. The result was a serial approach to the design of the RQ-4B that 
increased cost significantly. 
10. Formal engineering reviews were lacking. To minimize the cost impact, there was little 
preparation, and the attitude was “come as you are.” Consequently, reviews lacked 
detail; risks were often not identified; and, when risks were identified, the closure plans 
were often missing. This shortfall was specifically noted in the Block 20 “Critical 
Design Review (CDR)” and January 2006 Design Review for Block 30. 
11. In many cases, proper test/validation resources were not available at the different 
levels, including the subcontractors. For example, hardware and software changes were 
not tested properly at the subcontractor facilities because of lack of test equipment. 
Deficiencies would not be found until they entered testing on the hot bench at Northrop 
Grumman. The software or hardware would then have to be returned to the 
subcontractor for corrective action. Another example is that there were no test units 
procured for sensor development; only production test units, and this sometimes led to 
delays in the delivery of units to the aircraft. 
12. Initially, the contractor was responsible for the flight test program. When the decision 
was made at the three-star level to transfer responsibility to the Air Force, the 
Combined Test Force was behind the power curve relative to preparing Flight Test 
Plans, developing a flight test schedule, etc. The Program Office had an inadequate 
appreciation for the associated cost in developing the Combined Test Force. However, 
as noted earlier, the decision to transfer test responsibility was made at the three-star 
level to correct an operational problem, not address a cost issue.  
13. Many of the traditional disciplined engineering processes were neither included in the 
contract nor funded and, thus, were not part of the development/verification process. 
Both the Program Office and Northrop Grumman preferred to implement a better 
systems engineering program, but inadequate funding drove cutbacks, and systems 
engineering was an easy target. As a result, there were no integrity programs for the 
engine, subsystems, and avionics. Even though the ASIP was included in the SOW, it 
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was inadequately implemented. For example, there was no fatigue article, and the EMD 
air vehicle was never redesigned to the standard gust load margin of 1.5. Likewise, the 
standard Air Force software management processes were not followed; Computer 
Software Configuration Items (CSCIs) were not identified, proper test processes for 
CSCIs were not established, proper regression testing did not always take place, etc. 
When contractors/subcontractors would encounter problems with safety critical 
software, they would make a fix and then continue testing without performing the 
necessary regression testing. 
14. The software development/verification process was significantly underestimated. There 
was no one person at either the Program Office or Northrop Grumman overseeing the 
entire software process. Northrop Grumman had formed a Software IPT, but it did not 
monitor the subcontractor software closely. Likewise, a Software Executeability 
Review found that the cost-estimating technique was inadequate. 
15. There were multiple spirals occurring simultaneously, and few, if any, knew how the 
“pieces” fit together. The spirals tended to be fluid with changes occurring until the 
very end of a spiral. The contractor tried to be responsive per the objectives of Agile 
Acquisition, but the changes led to overruns.  
16. The Verification Cross-Reference Index used by the program merely designated 
analysis, demonstration, test, and inspection for verification of the requirements. There 
was no explanation of the deliverables necessary to show compliance. This led to 
increased time and cost to generate more data and generate unplanned reports necessary 
to convince the Air Force that a particular requirement was satisfied. 
17. The need for technical documentation was not emphasized in the ACTD program, so 
the people on the program often became the repository of information. There were 
numerous personnel changes during EMD/Production. When individuals left, their 
corporate knowledge of the program was lost. Data would sometimes have to be re-
generated, and new people would have to be trained. 
2003 Report for Congress 
In an April 2003 Report for Congress, it was concluded that “The Air Force is striving to meet its 
$48 million goal for unit cost, with research and development costs increasing the price of the 
unit to as high as $73 million.”46
This view was further echoed by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which noted 
that, what was once a $10 million (FY94 dollars) air vehicle “has become at least $30-40 million 
aircraft, and the cost will increase substantially further as additional and improved sensors, and 
corresponding power/payload upgrades, are added.”
 It also noted that there was a concern among Air Force and 
DoD officials that the continual addition of new features and capabilities was making the 
program unaffordable.  
47
                                                 
46 Report for Congress: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, Elizabeth Bone and 
Christopher Bolkcom, Library of Congress, Order Code RL31872, 25 April 2003, Page CRS-35 
 This statement was obviously referring to 
the changes associated with the Spiral 2A and 2B upgrades. The Committee was further quoted as 
saying that there is “now an effort to flood the Global Hawk program with money, there are ad hoc 
47 ibid, Page CRS-36 
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plans for rapid, major upgrades before requirements have been established, and no sign of serious 
examination of where and how Global Hawk fits into an overall collection architecture.” 48
2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representative 
 
In November 2004, the GAO reported to Congress that the Global Hawk program was in need of 
change to reduce overall program risk. The report noted that, originally, program funding was 
spread almost evenly across 20 years. However, with the larger RQ-4B, funding was now 
compressed to roughly half the time, sometimes tripling the budgetary requirements in specific 
years (see Figure 3-10 in Paragraph 3.3.7). The program restructuring expanded the development 
by five years, while compressing the production by nine years. This restructuring resulted in 
significant concurrency between development and production during FY04 through FY10 (see 
Figure 3-11 in Paragraph 3.3.7). This concurrency meant that the Air Force would invest in 
almost half of the new, larger air vehicles before the production configuration would be validated 
through flight testing. Likewise, full rate production would begin before the SIGINT (Block 30) 
and multiplatform radar (Block 40) configurations completed development and flight testing.  
The GAO Report also criticized the program’s cost growth. It stated that “The program’s total 
cost estimates have increased by nearly $900 million, driven by a threefold increase in 
development costs to pay for the development of a new and larger air vehicle. As a result, the 
program acquisition cost increased 44 percent since the program started.” 49 Figure 30 depicts 
the program cost growth as a function of time. 
 
Figure 30. Global Hawk Program's Cost, Quantity, and Unit Costs50
The original March 2001 plan referenced in Figure 30 involved acquiring the basic system very 
similar to the successful ACTD configuration and then incrementally developing and procuring 
systems with more advanced sensors as the critical technologies were demonstrated on the same 
platform. The original plan included 63 RQ-4A air vehicles and 14 ground stations.  
 
                                                 
48 ibid, Page CRS-36 
49 GAO-05-6, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce 
Program Risks, Government Accountability Office, November 2004, Page 3 
50 ibid, Page 12 
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The first restructuring in March 2002 was because of introduction of the RQ-4B. Development 
costs increased as the result of the desire to develop the capability quickly. To help offset costs, 
the user revised his requirements to include only 51 air vehicles and 10 ground stations. Even 
with these reductions, the total procurement costs increased because of the higher air vehicle unit 
cost and the plan to equip all larger platforms with the multi-intelligence mission capability.  
The second restructuring was for affordability reasons. In December 2002, DoD decided to 
switch from all multi-mission capabilities to a mix of multi-mission and single mission RQ-4Bs. 
This switch lowered the procurement costs by decreasing the required number of sensors. 
The report concluded that the new Global Hawk strategy associated with the larger RQ-4B did 
not fully embrace the knowledge-based approach expressed by the DoD’s acquisition guidance 
and best practices. It stated that “While the original acquisition strategy more closely adhered to 
this approach, the restructured strategy has caused gaps in knowledge about technology, design, 
and manufacturing at major investment decision points. These actions changed the underpinnings 
of the program's original business case and increased likelihood of future cost increases and 
schedule delays in delivering the capabilities expected by the warfighter.”51
The report recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to a) revisit the 
decision for concurrent development and production, and b) develop a new business case that 
defines the warfighter needs consistent with available technology, engineering capability, time, 
and money. To manage risk, the report also recommended that the Secretary delay further 
procurement of the RQ-4B, other than the test units, until a new business case was embraced that 
reduced risk and justified further investments. DoD disagreed with both recommendations, 
contending that risks were indeed being managed effectively and that the GAO approach would 
require additional time and money. 
 
Announcement of Breach in Excess of 15 Percent 
In April 2005, the Air Force reported to Congress a breach of 18 percent in procurement unit cost 
over the 2002 approved baseline. In the Air Force letter to Congress, the breach was primarily 
attributed to the increase of air vehicle capacity to accommodate requirements for a more 
sophisticated, integrated imagery and SIGINT sensor suite. The letter referred to the 2002 
program restructuring that added a new, larger, and more capable air vehicle. It noted that the 
2002 baseline planned to procure only the smaller RQ-4A but the new, larger RQ-4B required 
more extensive changes to the fuselage, tail, and landing gear. As a result of this letter to 
Congress, the program came under closer scrutiny, particularly by the GAO. Everything was 
now being examined with many additional items being included in the estimate, even some items 
associated with future spirals. 
Announcement of Breach in Excess of 25 Percent 
In December 2005, the GAO reported that the Air Force had failed to report $401 million in 
procurement costs. Program officials stated that the unreported costs were for items needed to 
meet the warfighter requirements and bring the RQ-4B to a common configuration. This 
included items, such as SIGINT sensors and ground station enhancements that would require 
retrofit after the air vehicle or ground station left the production line. Likewise, development and 
procurement cost increases and schedule slips resulted in deferring some items until later in the 
                                                 
51 ibid. Page 4 
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program and reclassifying costs. For example, the approved 2002 baseline called for 25 SIGINT 
sensors to be installed on the production line, but cost pressures and schedule changes caused the 
program to move the cost for 10 of the sensors worth $123 million to a different account targeted 
for modifications following delivery. Because historic DoD practices did not include 
modifications in the program baseline, the Air Force stated that they did not include these 
modification costs in the report. OSD officials responsible for the SARs stated that, historically, 
modification costs were not included in these reports to Congress, because modifications were 
typically for new capabilities or changes following delivery of a fully capable system. Both OSD 
and the Air Force did agree on one thing: “…a factor contributing to uncertainty is that DoD 
policies and practices have been increasingly streamlined to provide less detailed guidance and 
may need to be updated to keep pace with new business practices such as evolutionary and spiral 
development.”52
Figure 31 shows the impact of adding the $401 million for modification costs. The result is a 31 
percent breach over the approved December 2002 baseline. The 2005 GAO Report also 
concluded that adding the modification costs would also result in a breach of program acquisition 
unit cost growth of 19 percent compared to the 11 percent reported in the SAR. 
  
 
Figure 31. Procurement Unit Cost (in millions of dollars)53
DoD only partially agreed with the GAO findings. They agreed that the retrofit costs for the 10 
SIGINT sensors and one radar sensor were in the approved baseline and should have been 
included in the procurement unit cost reporting. Including these items increased the unit cost to 
22.5 percent over the baseline versus the 18 percent previously reported to Congress and 
included in the annual SAR. DoD did not agree that the other remaining modifications were also 
reportable, since they were outside the scope of the historical reporting practice. 
 
Despite DoD’s position, the GAO Report made the following recommendation: “We recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics to revise the Global Hawk report and take the necessary actions to comply with the 
legislation for reporting and certification.” 54
As a result, the Air Force re-notified Congress in December 2005 that “…if these additional 
costs were included, the procurement unit cost had actually increased by over 25 percent and that 
program acquisition unit costs (including development and military construction costs in addition 
 
                                                 
52 GAO-06-222R, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in Report, Government 
Accountability Office, 15 December 2005, Page 4 
53 ibid, Page 5 
54 ibid, Page 5 
 
Global Hawk Systems Engineering Case Study 
 
 
Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFIT/SY) 
Air Force Institute of Technology  
 Page - 79  
ID 8844  
 
to procurement) had also breached the thresholds established in the law.”55
3.3.14.2 Recertification 
 The SAR for the 
quarter ending December 31, 2005, was submitted to Congress on April 6, 2006. It stated that the 
Global Hawk program had experienced a unit cost breach of more than 25 percent to the current 
baseline estimate. It further stated that notification and unit cost breach information would be 
provided to the Congress and that the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [AT&L]) 
would consider whether or not to recertify the program. The result was that DoD now had 60 
days to recertify the program.  
As part of the recertification process, the OSD conducted a review of the Global Hawk program. 
A management evaluation was conducted in the following seven areas: Schedule, EVMS, 
Management Reserves (MR), Contract Strategy, Personnel, Systems Engineering Practices, 
Sustainment/Supportability, and Operational Testing Strategy. 
Some of the more significant findings of the seven areas listed above include: 
1. Requirements definition and decomposition were the major root cause of program 
issues. Requirements tended to be unstable, traceability to components and modules 
lacking, flow down of requirements to subcontractors often missing, and validation of 
systems/subsystems missing. 
2. Schedule management tools were now just being matured, and the outlook was 
optimistic. Until recently, there had not been a method to analyze schedules at the 
program level, particularly across contracts. 
3. IMS lacked the necessary detailed schedules for subcontracted effort and Government 
activities. The contractor needed to move towards automated updates of the IMS 
database. 
4. IMP was not incorporated into the contract to define contractual responsibility for 
planned events. 
5. Weekly EVM had only been in place for several weeks, and the program needed a plan 
for using the EVM and MR data. 
6. The Development, Test, and Evaluation (DT&E) strategy was insufficient to reduce 
program risk and support decisions. Lower-level development tests were typically not 
used as a building block to system test, entry and exit criteria were typically missing, 
test planning and test procedures were inadequate, critical test parameters were not 
verified, test assets were lacking, and systems were not assessed against its intended 
environment. 
7. Adequate operational test and evaluation (OT&E) was planned too late in the 
acquisition cycle. 
8. The current depot activation plan did not support activation by Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC)+4. 
                                                 
55 GAO-06-447, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to Craft Better and 
Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, Government Accountability Office, March 2006, Page 7 
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9. Systems engineering planning, processes, and staffing had improved significantly since 
summer 2005. 
The review also considered the findings of an Air Force Independent Review Team (IRT) 
Assessment completed in January 2005, a review of the Government management structure, and 
a review of the primary systems integrator management structure. In reviewing the January 2005 
IRT findings, the OSD noted that software development, systems engineering, and cost growth 
were areas of high risk. However, they concluded that recommendations from the earlier IRT 
were being implemented, but metrics were just beginning to show progress.  
Based on the review findings, the OSD restructured the program, developed a new cost estimate 
that was deemed reasonable, and established a set of recommendations that the Air Force agreed 
to implement. On June 5, 2006, The Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg, USD (AT&L), sent various 
members of Congress a letter justifying continuation of the program. In the letter, he certified the 
restructured Global Hawk program that: 
1. The Global Hawk program was essential to national security. 
2. There were no alternatives to the Global Hawk program that would provide equal or 
greater military capability at less cost. 
3. The new estimates of program acquisition unit cost and procurement unit cost were 
reasonable. 
4. The management structure was adequate to manage and control acquisition unit cost 
and procurement unit cost. 
The restructured program was defined as a system comprised of aircraft, payloads, ground 
elements, and support elements. The program was limited to production of no more than five 
aircraft per year until Block 20/30 IOT&E was accomplished, which was planned for fall 2008. 
The restructuring extended production from 2011 to 2015. The LRIP quantity was limited to one 
Block 10 system, one Block 20 system, three Block 30 systems, and one Block 40 system. 
In justifying that the new estimates of program acquisition unit cost and procurement unit cost 
were reasonable, the OSD used the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), since they were 
viewed as an independent assessor. Based on their findings, the program acquisition unit cost and 
procurement unit cost were estimated as shown in Figure 32. 
 BY00$M TY$M 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost   
 Cost 7988 9491 
 Unit Cost 148 176 
   
Procurement Unit Cost   
 Cost 4842 5857 
 Unit Cost 90 108 
Figure 32. Restructured Program Cost as of May 2006 
OSD also concluded that the management structure was adequate to manage and control program 
acquisition unit cost and procurement unit cost if the following recommendations directed in the 
June 2006 Acquisition Decision Memorandum were implemented: 
• Conduct a risk evaluation of design and planning for material readiness. 
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• Integrate the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) into the management 
process. 
• Improve the Award Fee process to incentivize Northrop Grumman. 
• Complete a Depot Activation Plan, Source of Repair Assignment Process (SORAP), and 
Depot Maintenance Inter-service Process. 
• Review and update, if necessary, the new IMS/IMP, with attention given to 
improvements in electronic updates from subcontractors and incorporation of 
Government events. 
• Review systems engineering implementation and management (including software, risk, 
subcontractor specifications, subcontractor drawings, and quality assurance). 
• Update the TEMP to provide an event-driven OT&E strategy consistent with planned 
production decisions. 
The USD (AT&L), Kenneth Krieg, sent letters containing the above justification to the 
appropriate members of Congress on June 5, 2006. Congress concurred with the recertification, 
and the Air Force moved forward, implementing the recommendations outlined in the letters. 
3.3.14.3 Resultant Actions Taken by the Program 
Based on the findings of the OSD review and letters sent to Congress, the Program Office 
implemented a number of actions to improve their overall program management. Those noted 
during the case study interview process include: 
1. More structured approach to requirements management. Requirements resided in 
various non-contractual documents and notebooks, and the only single source for 
requirements was the Requirements Management Specification (RMS). The program 
had recently focused on adding traceability to the RMS, and the RMS had been placed 
in the Data Object-Oriented Repository System (DOORS). Also, Technical Review 
Boards have been established to help ensure traceability of requirements. 
2. Creation of a single IMS. 
3. Increased focus on software development and verification. The software qualification 
process has been more thoroughly defined, better configuration control has been 
established for units in test, and improved Acceptance Test Procedures have been 
implemented. 
4. Improved Airworthiness Certification Process. ASC/EN has been more integrated into 
the certification process, since they must ultimately approve the TACC and coordinate 
on the final certification. 
5. Development and implementation of a Systems Engineering Plan. The Program Office 
authored a tailored Systems Engineering Plan and is now executing to that plan. 
6. Elimination of spirals. The program now uses blocks instead of spirals. Previously, 
participants knew when a spiral started but not always when it ended. This sometimes 
resulted in disputes between the contractor and Air Force relative to whether or not 
certain overruns were attributed to a specific contract. 
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7. More timely use of EVMS. Technical performance and schedule performance data are 
now transferred electronically into the EVMS. 
8. Initiation of a Materiel Improvement Project Review Board (MIPRB) with emphasis 
on user involvement. 
9. More traditional Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs) and CDRs. 
10. Refocus of the systems engineering management team and increased scope of their 
reviews. Previously, the systems engineering management team dealt mostly with air 
vehicle issues and considered very few specification changes, in-work changes, or 
changes to test procedures. Northrop Grumman increased the technical scope of the 
reviews and instituted a Technical Review Board. Any changes to the baseline at the 
system level is now reviewed by the Technical Review Board, so all IPTs are aware of 
and concur that the changes are appropriate, executable, and verifiable. 
4. SUMMARY 
The Global Hawk program was founded on the concept of providing the user with a system that 
was relatively inexpensive and quick to field. This provided the warfighter with a vehicle that 
could more readily be sent into high risk areas to obtain valuable intelligence information. If the 
unit was shot down, there was no loss of a pilot, and there was no major loss of dollars. The 
Global Hawk program was unique in many ways. For example: 
a. It was the first ACTD program that emphasized heavy user involvement. 
b. The ACTD program strategy used a provision of a newly adopted legislation that 
permitted the removal of many oversight rules and regulations typically required by 
Government acquisitions. The authority granted by this provision was known as Section 
845 OTA.  
c. The ACTD program was one of the few that truly focused on unit cost. The only 
requirement communicated to the contractor was a $10 million (FY94 dollars) UFP. All 
technical performance objectives were tradable. 
d. With the latitude granted by Section 845, the contractor was initially designated as the 
RTO for the flight testing at Edwards AFB. 
e. The Global Hawk was one of the few prototypes to be deployed into combat, 
participating in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Because of the numerous successes of the ACTD program, the Global Hawk won the 2000 
Collier Trophy. The following year, it made aviation history by flying 7,500 miles non-stop from 
Edwards AFB to the RAAF Base in Edinburgh. This new distance record for a UAV was 
completed in just 22 hours. 
Because of the successful demonstrations, Northrop Grumman received additional contracts with 
the Navy, Germany, and Australia. As a result of the joint Air Force/Australian exercise, 
Australia established a four-year agreement called Project Agreement 13 to develop the Global 
Hawk as a replacement for Australia’s aging fleet of P-3C Orions. As a result of the highly 
successful German demonstration, the German MoD awarded a contract to EuroHawk GmbH, a 
joint venture company formed by EADS and Northrop Grumman, for the development, test, and 
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support of the Euro Hawk system. It is also safe to say that the GHMD contributed to Northrop 
Grumman winning the Navy contract for the Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV. 
The ACTD program was highly successful with the program ultimately demonstrating the 
military utility of an unmanned system in an operational environment. The prototype aircraft 
even participated in combat, supporting the war on terrorism. However, the ACTD phase did 
have several shortcomings. First, the program requirements changed over the period of the 
ACTD phase, resulting in a more expensive air vehicle. Also, the ACTD program evolved to 
eliminate the elements necessary to demonstrate that the system was ready for production, as 
planned in the original strategy.  
As a production program, the Global Hawk continued to use innovative acquisition strategies. 
Spiral development was used to incrementally develop capabilities that, when ready, would be 
incorporated into a production baseline. The concept was to deliver an operational capability to 
the user in a shorter period of time. This approach was consistent with the new acquisition 
strategies being developed by the senior management within the Air Force. In 2002, Dr. Marvin 
Sambur, then Assistant SAF for Acquisition, designated the Global Hawk as one of his six 
Pathfinder programs designed to deliver a needed capability to the warfighter in the shortest time 
possible. As a result, the schedules for the Block 20 and beyond air vehicles were compressed by 
nine years. To achieve scheduled milestones, significant concurrency was imposed between the 
development and production programs. This concurrency, coupled with an underestimation of 
the changes associated with the larger Block 20 aircraft, contributed to cost overruns resulting in 
a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The result was that the program was forced to recertify, adding realism 
to cost and schedule, as well as implementing some changes to how the program is managed. 
The Global Hawk now continues as a viable, stronger program. It has revolutionized the conduct 
of military combat by providing the warfighter with the ability to make decisions based on 
persistent and continuous near-real-time simultaneous EO/IR and on-board processed SAR 
imagery, thus providing the warfighter with a capability that is changing the face of modern 
aviation. 
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6. APPENDICES 
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airworthiness certification approach for the E-8; and rewrote the ASC Guidance Document for 
Systems Engineering Plans at WPAFB. 
Before his employment at MacAulay-Brown, Mr. Kinzig spent 35 years at ASC/EN, working 
aircraft acquisition. He began his career in the Subsystems Branch, supporting a myriad of 
aircraft, such as the E-3, F-4, A-7K, F-16, B-2, and KC-10. He expanded his responsibilities 
while working on the F-22, eventually leading the Aircraft Systems IPT. From there, he was 
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Member of the Airworthiness Control Board, Senior Member of the Air Force Fleet Viability 
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Appendix B. ACRONYMS 
ACC Air Combat Command 
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
AFB Air Force Base 
AFC2ISR Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
AFCSE Air Force Center for Systems Engineering 
AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center 
AFI Air Force Instruction 
AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center 
AFPD Air Force Policy Directive 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASC Aeronautical Systems Center 
ASIP Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 
A/V Air Vehicle 
C2 Command and Control 
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
CAIV Cost As an Independent Variable 
CAX Combined Arms Exercise 
CCDR Contractor Cost Data Report 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CFSR Contract Funds Status Report 
CGS Common Ground Segment 
CIGSS Common Imagery Ground Surface System 
COA Certificate of Authorization 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
CPIF Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
CPR Cost Performance Report 
CSCI Computer Software Configuration Item 
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CWBS Contractor Work Breakdown Structure 
CY Calendar Year 
D&E Demonstration and Evaluation 
DAES Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
DARO Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency  
DLL Design Limit Load 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDAF DoD Architectural Framework 
DOORS Data Object-Oriented Repository System 
DT&E Development, Test, and Evaluation 
DTC Design To Cost 
EADS European Aeronautical Defense and Space 
EIA Electronics Industrial Association 
EISS Enhanced Integrated Sensor Suite 
ELINT Electronic Intelligence 
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
EO Electro-Optical 
ESC Electronic Systems Center 
EVM Earned Value Management 
EVMS Earned Value Management System 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FFRR First-Flight Readiness Review 
FLTS Flight Test Squadron  
FY Fiscal Year 
FYDP Five-Year Defense Plan 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GATM Global Air Traffic Management 
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GFE Government-furnished Equipment 
GHMD Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration 
GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator 
GOSG General Officer Steering Group 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HAE High Altitude Endurance 
HQ Headquarters 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICD Interface Control Document 
IDA Institute for Defense Analyses 
IDD Interface Definition Document 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IFC Integrated Functional Capability 
IMINT Imagery Intelligence 
IMP Integrated Master Plan 
IMS Integrated Master Schedule 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
IPPD Integrated Product and Process Development 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
IR Infrared 
IRT Independent Review Team 
ISS Integrated Sensor Suite 
IT Information Technology  
JFCOM Joint Forces Command 
JPO Joint Program Office 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JTF Joint Task Force 
JTFEX Joint Task Force Exercise 
KVA Kilo-Volt-Amperes 
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LOS Line of Sight 
LRE Launch and Recovery Element 
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 
MA Mishap Aircraft 
MAR Monthly Acquisition Report 
MAV Mishap Air Vehicle 
MC2A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft 
MCE Mission Control Element 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
MIL-HDBK Military Handbook 
MIL-SPEC Military Specification 
MIL-STD Military Standard  
MIPRB Material Improvement Project Review Board 
MoD Ministry of Defense 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure of Performance 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
MP Mishap Pilot 
MPP Modernization Planning Process 
MP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 
MR Management Reserve 
MS Microsoft 
NAS Naval Air Station 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NAWC Naval Air Warfare Center 
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 
NMUSAF National Museum of the United States Air Force 
OFP Operational Flight Program 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OTA Other Transactions Authority 
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OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PMD Program Management Directive 
POM Program Objective Memorandum 
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RMS Requirements Management Specification 
RTO Responsible Test Organization 
SAF Secretary of the Air Force 
SAMP Single Acquisition Management Plan 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SCD System Capability Document 
SDD Software Design Document 
SEIT Systems Engineering Integration Team 
SEMP Systems Engineering Master Plan 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SIL System Integration Laboratory 
SMM System Maturity Matrix 
SORAP Source of Repair Assignment Process 
SoS System-of Systems 
SOW Statement of Work 
SPO System Program Office 
SRD System Requirements Document 
SRS Software Requirements Specification 
TACC Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria 
TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System 
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TES Test and Evaluation Squadron 
TO Technical Order 
TPM Technical Performance Measure 
TRA Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical 
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TSPR Total System Performance Responsibility 
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle 
UFP Unit Flyaway Price 
USACOM United States Atlantic Command 
USC United States Code 
USD (A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology  
USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 
VDD Version Description Document 
WPAFB Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
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Appendix C. AMENDMENT 
 
Amendment  
 
Report No. 97-311 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1982 
November 3, 1981. – Ordered to be printed. 
CONFERENCE REPORT 
(To accompany S.815) 
  
TITLE IX—GENERAL PROVISIONS 
REPORTS ON UNIT COSTS OF MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
Sec. 917 (a)(1) The program manager (as designated by the Secretary concerned) for each major 
defense system included in the Selected Acquisition Report dated March 31, 1981, and submitted 
to Congress pursuant to section 811 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization 
Act, 1976 (Public Law 94-106; 10 U.S.C. 139 note), shall submit to the Secretary concerned, 
within seven days after the end of each quarter of fiscal year 1982, a written report on the major 
defense system included in such selected acquisition report for which such manager has 
responsibility. The program manager shall include in each such report -- 
(A) the total program acquisition unit cost for such major defense system as of the last 
day of such quarter; and 
(B) in the case of a major defense system for which procurement funds are authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act, the current procurement unit cost for such major defense 
system as of the last day of such quarter. 
2) If at any time during any quarter of fiscal year 1982, the program manager of a major 
defense system referred to in paragraph (1) has reasonable cause to believe that (A) the 
total program acquisition unit cost, or (B) in the case of a major defense system for which 
procurement funds are authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the current procurement 
unit cost has exceeded the applicable percentage increase specified in subsection (b), such 
manager shall immediately submit to the Secretary concerned a report containing the 
information, as of the date of such report, required by paragraph (1). 
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3) The program manager shall also include in each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) 
or (2) any change from the Selection Acquisition Report of March 31, 1981, in schedule 
milestones or system performances with respect to such system that are known, expected, 
or anticipated by such manager. 
(b)(1) If the Secretary concerned determines, on the basis of any report submitted to him 
pursuant to subsection (a), that the total program acquisition unit cost (including any increase 
for expected inflation) for any major defense system for which no procurement funds are 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act has increased by more than 15 percent over the total 
program acquisition unit cost for such system reflected in the Selected Acquisition Report of 
March 31, 1981, then (except as provided in paragraph (3)) no additional funds may be 
obligated in connection with such system after the end of the 30-day period beginning on the 
day on which the Secretary makes such determination. The Secretary shall notify the Congress 
promptly in writing of such increase upon making such a determination with respect to any 
such major defense system and shall include in such notice the date on which such 
determination was made. 
(2) If the Secretary concerned determines, on the basis of a report submitted to him pursuant to 
subsection (a), that –  
(A) the procurement unit cost of a major defense system for which procurement funds are 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act has increased by more than 15 percent over the 
procurement unit cost derived from the Selected Acquisition Report of March 31, 1981, 
or  
(B) the total program acquisition unit cost (including any increase for expected inflation) 
of such system has increased by more than 15 percent over the total program acquisition 
unit cost for such system as reflected in the Selected Acquisition Report of March 31, 
1981, or  
then (except as provided in paragraph (3)) no additional funds may be obligated in connection 
with such system after the end of the 30-day period on the day which the Secretary makes 
such determination. The Secretary shall notify the Congress promptly in writing of such 
increase upon making such a determination with respect to any such major defense system and 
shall include in such notice the date on which such determination was made. 
(3) The prohibition contained in paragraphs (1) and (2) on the obligation of funds shall not 
apply in the case of any major defense system to which such prohibition would otherwise 
apply if the Secretary concerned submits to the Congress, before the end of the 30-day period 
referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), a written report which includes – 
(A) a statement of the reasons for such increase in total program acquisition unit cost or 
procurement unit cost; 
(B) the identities of the military and civilian officers responsible for program 
management and cost control of the major defense system; 
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(C) the action taken and proposed to be taken to control future cost growth of such 
system; 
(D) any changes made in the performance or schedule milestones of such system and the 
degree to which such changes have contributed to the increase in total program 
acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost; 
(E) the identities of the principal contractors for the major defense system; and 
(F) an index of all testimony and documents formally provided to the Congress on the 
estimated cost of such system. 
(c)(1) If the Secretary concerned –  
(A) on the basis of a report submitted to him pursuant to subsection (a), determines (i) 
that the total program acquisition unit cost (including an increase for expected inflation) 
for a major defense system has increased by more than 25 percent over the total program 
acquisition unit cost or such system reflected in the Selected Acquisition Report of March 
31, 1981, or (ii) in the case of any such system for which procurement funds are 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act, that the current procurement unit cost of such 
system has increased by more than 25 percent over the procurement unit cost derived 
from the Selected Acquisition Report of March 31, 1981, and  
(B) has submitted a report to the Congress with respect to such system pursuant to 
subsection (b)(3),  
then (except as provided in paragraph (2)) no additional funds may be obligated in connection 
with such system after the end of the 60-day period beginning on the day on which the Secretary 
makes such determination.  
(2) The prohibition contained in paragraph (1) on the obligation of funds shall not apply in the 
case of a major defense system to which such prohibition would otherwise apply if the Secretary 
of Defense submits to the Congress, before the end of the 60-day period referred to in such 
paragraph, a written certification stating that -  
(A) such system is essential to the national security;  
(B) there are no alternatives to such system which will provide equal or greater military 
capability at less cost;  
(C) the new estimates of the total program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost 
are reasonable; and  
(D) the management structure for such major defense system is adequate to manage and 
control total program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost.  
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(d) As used in this section: 
(1) The term “total program acquisition unit cost” means, in the case of a major defense 
system, the amount equal to (A) the total cost for development and procurement of, and 
system-specific military construction for, such system, divided by (B) the number of fully 
configured end items to be produced for such a system. 
(2) The term “procurement unit cost” means, in the case of a major defense system, the 
amount equal to (A) the total of all procurement funds available for such system in any 
fiscal year, divided by (B) the number of fully-configured end items to be procured with 
such funds during such fiscal year. 
(3) The term “Secretary concerned” has the same meaning as provided in section 101(8) 
of title 10, United States Code. 
(e) Section 811 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976 (Public 
Law 94-106; 10 U.S.C. 139 note), is amended by addition at the end thereof the following new 
subsection: 
“(c)(1) Each report required to be submitted under subsection (a) shall include the history of the 
total program acquisition unit cost of each major defense system from the date on which funds 
were first authorized to be appropriated for such system. 
“(2) As used in this subsection, the term ‘total program acquisition unit cost’ means the amount 
equal to (A) the total cost for development and procurement of, and system-specific military 
construction for, a major defense system, divided by (B) the number of fully configured end 
items to be produced for such a system.”  
